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Mind the Gap: A Systematic Approach to
the International Criminal Court’s
Arrest Warrants Enforcement
Problem
Nadia Banteka†
International Criminal Courts and Tribunals (“ICCTs”) have been
established on a belying enforcement paradox between their significant
mandate and their inherent lack of enforcement powers due to the absence
of systemic law enforcement. This Article is premised on the idea that
ICCTs fail to procure substantial results due to their delusive persistence in
rejecting the factoring of politics in their operation. Thus, I suggest a perspective for arrest warrant enforcement that not only recognizes the relevance of politics but also capitalizes on it. I argue that by fully
comprehending its enforcement tools and making use of its political role,
the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) may increase its rates in the
apprehension of suspects and secure higher levels of judicial enforcement.
Based on different compliance theories, I argue that the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC (“OTP”) can improve compliance with ICC arrest warrants
by making use of third states and non-state actors. In Part I, I address the
way states and international actors may assist the OTP towards unwillingness to arrest states through inducements, reputational sanctions, and support for enforcement agencies. I propose that external pressure in the form
of positive inducements (i.e., membership and development aid) or negative inducements (i.e., travel bans and asset freezes), as well as condemnation and reputational damage towards non-compliant states, are likely to
increase compliance with arrest warrants. In Part II, I examine a strategy
for the OTP towards states that are willing to arrest but are unable to do so.
In these cases, the OTP would benefit from improving its institutional
capacity to identify and use overlapping interests with activist states in the
field of human rights and international justice through the establishment
of a diplomatic arm within its Jurisdiction, Complementarity, and Cooperation Division. I unpack the question of what this engagement may look
like by examining such a potential relationship between the United States
and the ICC. Finally, in Part III, I focus on the instances where civil society
† Assistant Professor in International Law, INTERVICT, Tilburg Law School. I
would like to thank William Burke-White for his valuable feedback on earlier drafts.
Thank you also to Svetlana Atanasova, Olivia Flasch, and Rieneke Boterenbrood for their
excellent research assistance. Finally, thank you to the editors of the Cornell
International Law Journal for their constructive suggestions and edits. All remaining
errors are my own.
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has the ability to influence third states or situation states to assist in the
execution of arrest warrants. Here, I argue that the OTP ought to include
different actors within the global civil society (such as NGOs and transnational networks) during its efforts.
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Introduction
The issue of the alleged influence of politics over international law is
far from a new phenomenon.1 Political overtones in international law have
commonly been approached with skepticism and aggravation due to their
close affiliation with notions of power, interests, and a stale conception of
state sovereignty.2 Despite the triumph of legal positivism as the dominant
school of thought, the twentieth century saw a procession of claims that
international law was undergoing a rush of fundamental change, moving
closer to the individual than ever before.3 All this took place in an environ1. See WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 3
(1964).
2. See PHILLIP JESSUP, A MODERN LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION 8– 9 (1948).
3. See generally JORGE AMERICANO, THE NEW FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1947); FRIEDMANN, supra note 1; JESSUP, supra note 2; ALFRED ZIMMERN, THE LEAGUE OF
NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW 1918– 1935 (1936).
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ment where the particles of state unilateralism and multilateralism interacted under inelastic collisions, and where states were constantly
confronted with the Hedgehog’s dilemma.4 This new dynamic of international law called for a reconstruction of the endemic relationship between
international justice and politics in light of an increasingly individualized
and interconnected world.
The atrocities of World War II (“WWII”) compelled an international
outcry resulting in univocal demand for international criminal justice.5
The subsequent humanitarian and human rights developments in international law have been primarily based on this momentum. A new judicial
world emanated, where crimes against international law were no longer
committed by abstract entities but by men6 who were to be held accountable for their actions before a court of law.7 The end of the Cold War coincided with the rise of ethnic conflicts sealed by mass murders and
egregious human rights violations, thus transpiring a renewed interest by
“like-minded states”8 to rise to the occasion.9 This climate broke new
ground in the established international law enforcement regime, and
spurred departure from the single, skeletal notion of state responsibility to
individual accountability through criminal jurisdiction before International Criminal Courts and Tribunals (“ICCTs”).10
This new system, however, includes caveats.11 One of its most vulnerable areas is the “arrest and surrender” system for indicted individuals.12
4. See ARTHUR SCHOPENHAUER, 2 PARERGA UND PARALIPOMENA: KLEINE PHILOSOPHISCHE
SCHRIFTEN 651– 52 (Eric F.J. Payne trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1974) (1851) (depicting a
group of hedgehogs who need to huddle together for warmth yet are struggling to find
the optimal distance where they may feel sufficiently warm without hurting one
another. Inevitably, the hedgehogs will be faced with the dilemma of sacrificing either
warmth for comfort or comfort for warmth); see also GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, POWER
POLITICS: A STUDY OF WORLD SOCIETY 12 (1964).
5. See Frédéric Mégret, Epilogue to an Endless Debate: The International Criminal
Court’s Third Party Jurisdiction and the Looming Revolution of International Law, 12 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 247, 261 (2001).
6. See 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL 223 (1947).
7. See Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis, art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, art. 7, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 284, 288.
8. See Press Release, Secretary General, Secretary-General Urges ‘Like-Minded’
States to Ratify Statute of International Criminal Court, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/
6686 (Sept. 1, 1998) (calling for the global community to sign the Rome Statute of the
International Court of Justice); cf Joseph Lelyveld, The Defendant, NEW YORKER, May 27,
2002, at 82, 87 (“The total of sixty-six ratifying nations included America’s closest
allies . . . [but the] holdouts include Russia, China, and the ‘axis of evil’: Iran, Iraq, and
North Korea.”).
9. See U.N. Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N.
DOC. A/CONF/183/9 (July 17, 1998), reprinted in 37 INT’L L. MATERIALS 999, 1002
(1998).
10. See id.
11. Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT’L L. 2, 13 (1998).
12. Id. at 13– 14.
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The ability of the ICCTs to secure custody of those indicted has generated
much anecdotal debate revolving around power, interests, and norms.13
Despite the solid legal underpinnings of the ICCTs’ enforcement regime,
the ICCTs largely fail to procure tangible results due to their delusive persistence in rejecting the factoring of politics into the equation. While politics, including its interference with international judicial institutions,
cannot be sanctified, it remains an inextricable element of the international
system.14 This by no means offers a normative but rather a pragmatic
interpretation indicative of the way international law, institutions, and
international society have been operating through time.
Whether politics is the solution, the problem, or perhaps both,
requires a metaphysical and ontological evaluation of the field. Whichever
option one decides to adopt, however, one thing is certain: the involvement
of politics in international law is very much present and indubitable.15
Normative approaches are certainly scholastically relevant and significant.
But such endeavors neglect the practical utility of acknowledging certain
systemic features of international law and international relations. Inasmuch as this may seem to be a less bold or alluring exercise, the field of
international criminal law enforcement requires imminent results.16 This
is not to say that the relevance and potential of the more normative discussion ought to be discounted, but rather, that both enterprises are equally
important each on its own merit. For this reason, I suggest a perspective of
the arrest and surrender enforcement that not only recognizes the relevance of international politics in its sphere but also capitalizes on it. I
argue that by fully comprehending its enforcement tools, making use of its
political role, and the realities surrounding it, the International Criminal
Court (“ICC”) may increase its rates in the apprehension of suspects, and
secure higher levels of judicial enforcement.
More specifically, this Article uncovers the unused potential of the
ICC and particularly the OTP that can be directed towards increasing and
facilitating arrests. I utilize the three main analytical approaches from
international relations theory— realism, liberalism, and constructivism— to
construct a framework within which the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC
(“OTP”) can perceive itself as a political actor and utilize its leverage with
the international community. Instead of seeing these approaches as mutu13. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 116
(2005) (concluding that state compliance with the ICTY was procured by American
power); Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, Address at the Policy Briefing,
European Policy Centre, Brussels (July 3, 2007), http://www.icty.org/sid/8858 (suggesting that the arrests are owed to European Union conditionality); Harold Hongju
Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dept. of State, Special Briefing: U.S. Engagement with the International Criminal Court and the Outcome of the Recently Concluded Review Conference (June 15, 2010), http://www.state.gov/j/gcj/us_releases/remarks/2010/143178
.htm [hereinafter U.S. Engagement] (arguing in favor of a transnational legal process).
14. See Cassese, supra note 11, at 17.
15. Id.
16. Nadia Banteka, An Integrative Model for the ICC’s Enforcement of Arrest and Surrender Requests: Toward a More Political Court?, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES FACING THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 453, 457 (Richard H. Steinberg ed., 2016).
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ally exclusive approaches, I use them as different sets of lenses that can
shed light on distinct angles of the same issue with diverse conclusions.
Transcending this realism-idealism dichotomy allows us to look at the different levels of the enforcement problem through varied analytical tools. I
hypothesize that the OTP can improve compliance with ICC arrest warrants by making use of third-party states and non-state actors. I define
third-party states, or third states, as all other states except for the situation
state that is the one with the direct obligation to comply with the ICC
arrest warrant either through the Rome Statute or a United Nations Security Council (“UNSC”) Chapter VII Resolution.
Part I of this Article critically introduces the enforcement architectures
and realities of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) and the International Criminal Court.17 This juxtaposition
delineates the importance of political realities in the apprehension of suspects. Part II discusses the ICC’s bargaining leverage with third states as
well as the potential relationship it can develop with them. After distinguishing between unwilling and unable situation states, I address the way
third states may assist the OTP in the arrest and surrender process of
unwilling states through inducements, reputational sanctions, and support
for enforcement agencies. I argue that the OTP should embrace its political
role and, grounded in law and evidence, take political realities into account
but also use them to its advantage. The OTP can thus identify and use
overlapping interests with third states or activist states in the field of
human rights and international justice through increasing its political and
diplomatic capabilities with the establishment of a diplomatic arm within
its office. Finally, in Part III, I focus on the instances where civil society
has the ability to influence third states or situation states to assist in the
execution of arrest warrants. I argue that the OTP ought to address different actors within the global civil society such as NGOs, transnational networks, and individuals, simultaneously during its bargaining efforts, and
benefit from existing networks of transnational actors that support the
ICC.
I.

Enforcement of International Criminal Law

ICCTs have been established on a belying enforcement paradox
between their significant mandate and their inherent lack of enforcement
powers.18 This endogenous frailty lies on the predicament that, unlike
their national counterparts, they are not backed by systemic law enforcement.19 Instead, ICCTs are left to rely on external forces to procure
enforcement.20 Yet these “giants without arms and legs”21 preside over situations and crimes far more onerous to investigate and adjudicate than
17. Created pursuant to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July
17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
18. Mirjan Damaska, The International Criminal Court Between Aspiration and
Achievement, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 19, 19 (2009).
19. Id. at 21.
20. Id.
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standard domestic law offenses.22
A.

The Enforcement Regime in the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia

From the moment of its inception, the most pressing challenge the
ICTY faced was the timely apprehension of suspects.23 At Nuremberg, the
remaining instigators of Hitler’s Endlösung were captured and ceded by the
Allied Forces.24 But the ICTY began its mission with no defendants in
custody, entirely dependent on the cooperation of recalcitrant states,25 and
without the ability to hold trials in absentia.26 Among the complaints regularly aired in the United Nations General Assembly (“UNGA”) during the
ICTY Annual Report speeches was the Tribunal’s reliance on state cooperation as the primary means of apprehending indictees.27 Emphasis was further added on the need for more arrests of political and military leaders,
who were still at large and posed a fundamental risk of impunity.28
Indeed, the apprehension of indictees for international criminal courts
is perhaps an even more fundamental problem than that of mere enforcement. The inability to bring suspects to custody threatens to undermine
the entire construction of the international criminal justice constellation
and a large part of the human rights regime.29 Despite the initial pessimism regarding the prospects for apprehending its suspects,30 the ICTY,
under a perpetually prolonged life span, has managed to gain custody of all
those indicted that remained alive through the course of time.31 But looking at the realpolitik surrounding the Tribunal, it was, in large part, the
assistance from the European Union (“EU”) and the United States that
proved to be key factors in establishing both custody of the suspects and
the accumulation of evidence.32 Despite the backing of the UNSC towards
21. See Cassese supra note 11, at 13, 14 (“Notwithstanding this development, the
ICTY remains very much like a giant without arms and legs— it needs artificial limbs to
walk and work. And these artificial limbs are state authorities. If the cooperation of
states is not forthcoming, the ICTY cannot fulfill its functions. It has no means at its
disposal to force states to cooperate with it.”).
22. Id. at 11– 13.
23. Hazel Fox, An International Tribunal for War Crimes: Will the UN Succeed Where
Nuremberg Failed?, 49 WORLD TODAY 194, 196 (1993).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Cassese, supra note 11, at 10.
28. Id.
29. Steven D. Roper & Lilian A. Barria, State Co-Operation and International Criminal Court Bargaining Influence in the Arrest and the Surrender of Suspects, 21 LEIDEN J.
INT’L L. 457, 458 (2008).
30. Illustrative of this pessimism was Michael Scharf’s quote from the ICTY’s first
chief prosecutor Richard Goldstone, who lamented, “perhaps the real yardstick for
assessing the success of the [ICTY], is whether it leads to the establishment of a permanent international criminal court.” MICHAEL P. SCHARF, BALKAN JUSTICE: THE STORY
BEHIND THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL WAR CRIMES TRIAL SINCE NUREMBERG 228 (1997).
31. The Fugitives, INT’L CRIM. TRIB. FOR FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, http://www.icty.org/en/
about/office-of-the-prosecutor/the-fugitives (last visited Sept. 24, 2016).
32. Roper & Barria, supra note 29, at 460– 61.
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the ICTY by virtue of its establishment, and the multiple UNSC Resolutions calling for state cooperation in apprehensions of suspects, it was the
eventual cooperation of the key actors and external pressure that, according to many, triggered arrests.33 It is the relevance of such processes as the
United States and EU bargaining game with the states of the former Yugoslavia that may shed some different light on the process of creating a more
effective arrest and surrender regime in ICCTs.34 But as valuable as the
lessons from the ICTY may be, we ought to view them critically as linking
economic and political pressure to procure arrests evolved through an
uneasy path for more than a decade.
B.

The Enforcement Regime in the International Criminal Court

The founding of the ICC marked a fundamental turning point in the
pursuit of international criminal justice.35 But similar to the ICTY, the
ICC must also rely on state cooperation and judicial assistance in arrests
and surrenders.36 The Rome Statute in its comprehensive enforcement
architecture sets out in Article 86 the general obligation to cooperate with
the Court.37 Article 87(7) provides that failure by a state party to comply
with a request to cooperate shall allow the Court38 to refer the matter to
the Assembly of State Parties (“ASP”) or the UNSC for enforcement measures.39 Article 89(1) spells out the obligation to comply with the Court
when a state party receives a request for arrest and surrender of an
indicted individual located in its territory.40 Nevertheless, these provisions
are to be understood as equally reflecting a set of corollary facts: (1) the
33. Id.
34. The desire of the States that emerged out of the disintegration of FRY to join the
EU facilitated the key role of the EU in exerting outside pressure by conditioning admission to the Union on cooperation of the successor states with the Court. The ICTY
Prosecutor was requested by the Union to advise it on the question of whether state
cooperation was satisfactory. In 2007, in a briefing to the External Relations Council of
the Union, the ICTY Prosecutor conceded that without the pressure exerted by the EU
and its member states, her “mandate would be an impossible mission.” Carla Del Ponte,
Chief Prosecutor of the ICTY, Briefing of the General Affairs & External Relations Council of the European Union (Oct. 15, 2007).
35. The symbolic moment of a former head of state standing trial in an ICTY courtroom as the Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002 did not go unnoticed by
international relations or international legal scholars. E.g., RACHEL KERR, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: AN EXERCISE IN LAW, POLITICS
AND DIPLOMACY (2004) (describing scenes from the opening of the Milos̆eviæ trial).
36. Roper & Barria, supra note 29, at 465.
37. Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 86.
38. Goran Sluiter, The Surrender of War Criminals to the International Criminal
Court, 25 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 605, 614 (2003).
39. See Alain Pellet, Settlement of Disputes, in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1841, 1843 (Antonia Cassese et al. eds., 2002).
Pellet states that article 119, when read in conjunction with article 87(7), “empowers the
court to make findings on all questions relating to cooperation.”
40. See Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 89(1). Article 91(3) outlines the kind of
written material that must accompany the request for arrest and surrender. See also C.
Kreb & K. Prost, Article 89: Surrenders of Persons to the Court, in COMMENTARY ON THE
ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 1071, 1073 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999); Han-Ru Zhou, The Enforcement of Arrest War-
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Court has no power to compel state compliance with its requests,41 and (2)
the Court is unable to directly sanction states for lack of compliance.42
Rather, it has to take the long and indirect way via the ASP and the UNSC,
and even then with unlikely tangible results.43 This elaborate set of guidelines embodied in the Rome Statute paradoxically both weakens and
strengthens the Court.44 But at the end of the day, the success or failure of
the ICC will depend, in great part, on its enforcement system as encapsulated in the Rome Statute.45 This, in practice, means that similar to the
ICCTs that preceded it, the success of the ICC will depend on state cooperation and compliance regarding the arrest and surrender of suspects.46
The question that lingers, thus, is how the ICC will reverse the strenuous
legacy of the ICCTs that came before it, and the negative prophecies proclaiming that “[it] is unlikely to punish the Husseins and future Milos̆eviæs
of the world because it is unlikely to get a grip on them.”47
II. Towards a Different ICC Cooperation Model
The case of the ICTY reflects the political difficulties lodged in the
international criminal justice turf, where state and judicial interests stray
in different directions.48 This becomes especially salient considering the
inherent desire of those participating in international criminal justice to
establish a process that is based solely on law, transcending elements of
realpolitik that may otherwise emerge. The case of the ICTY illustrates the
relevance of state interests and politics in steering state action.49 Despite
his relatively pessimistic view of a self-defeating ICC, Goldsmith puts forth
a fair point in arguing that the ICTY example epitomizes the importance of
power politics to international criminal justice.50 For Goldsmith, the
rants by International Forces: From the ICTY to the ICC, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 202, 211– 12
(2006).
41. Leila Nadya Sadat & S. Richard Carden, The New International Criminal Court:
An Uneasy Revolution, 88 GEO. L.J. 381, 415– 16 (2000).
42. Id. at 416.
43. Id.
44. See Goran Sluiter, The Surrender of War Criminals to the International Criminal
Court, 25 LOYOLA L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 605, 650 (2002) (Sluiter argues that “[t]he
ad hoc tribunals were established with limited mandate. As a result of their swift creation, the Tribunals, especially the judges themselves, created much of the law . . . . On
the other hand, the establishment of the ICC by treaty triggered protracted rounds of
negotiations, which soon revealed that participating states were not prepared to have the
institution shape its own laws in any way. Since the shaping of the legal assistance
regime was left to the participating states, the resulting compromise left the system significantly weaker on a number of points”).
45. Jackson N. Maogoto, A Giant without Limbs: The International Criminal Court’s
State-Centric Cooperation Regime, 23 U. QUEENSLAND L.J. 102, 105 (2004).
46. Id.
47. Jack Goldsmith, The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court, 70 U. CHI. L.
REV. 89, 92 (2003).
48. Id. at 92– 93.
49. Christopher Rudolph, Constructing an Atrocities Regime: The Politics of War
Crimes Tribunals, 55 INT’L ORG. 655, 660 (2001).
50. Goldsmith, supra note 47, at 93.
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absence of the United States in the ICC serves as a catalyst for his sibylline
pronouncement of the Court’s lukewarm success rate.51 Such prediction
carried considerable merit during the days when the U.S. foreign policy
toward the ICC saw any engagement with the Court as a repulsive derogation from its sovereignty.52 But recent developments in U.S. foreign policy53 on the ICC allow space for further cerebration on possible
engagements despite the United States being a non-party to the Rome Statute. The same goes for other state and non-state parties that inadvertently
become part of the arrest and surrender system simply due to their position in the international community.
While the world may not be conceived entirely— or at all— as a “Machiavellian Utopia,”54 the importance and relevance of politics and interests
may not be undermined in the enforcement of arrest and surrender
requests. I argue that the ICC ought to manipulate this longstanding link
51. Id. Such importance can naturally bring forth both positive and negative results
dependent on how it is utilized. The case of the ICC illustrates the tension between the
need for great power support and the desire to establish a hard law regime that transcends power and political interests, a tension anticipated prior to the establishment of
the Court. See Michael Scharf & Valerie Epps, The International Trial of the Century? A
“Cross-Fire” Exchange on the First Case Before the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal, 29 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 635, 660 (1997).
52. Adrian Jones, Continental Divide and the Politics of Complex Sovereignty: Canada,
The United States and the International Criminal Court, 39 CANADIAN J. POL. SCI. 227, 238
(2006).
53. Most notably:
May 24, 2010: President Obama signs into law the Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009. In his signing statement, he recognizes the ICC’s role in dealing with Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA)
atrocities and states that [U.S.] policy supports bringing the LRA leadership to
justice.
May 27, 2010: President Obama issues the [U.S.] National Security Strategy
which affirms that “we are engaging with State Parties to the Rome Statute on
issues of concern and are supporting the ICC’s prosecution of those cases that
advance U.S. interests and values, consistent with the requirements of U.S. law.”
May 31– June 11, 2010: The [United States] participates in the Review Conference of the Rome Statute of the ICC in Kampala, Uganda. Following the conference, Legal Adviser Koh tells reporters, “After 12 years, I think we have reset the
default on the U.S. relationship with the court from hostility to positive
engagement.”
...
November 24, 2010: President Obama calls for leaders of the Lord’s Resistance
Army, wanted by the ICC for alleged atrocities in Uganda to be brought to justice in order to create a lasting peace.
...
February 26, 2011: The [United States] co-sponsors and votes in favor of Resolution 1970, adopted unanimously by the UN Security Council, referring the situation in Libya to the ICC.
Chronology of U.S. Actions Related to the International Criminal Court, AM. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORG. COAL. FOR ICC, http://www.amicc.org/docs/US%20Chronology.pdf (last
visited Apr. 28, 2012) (providing a chronograph of the gradual shift in U.S. policy
towards the ICC).
54. See Hans J. Morgenthau, The Machiavellian Utopia, 55 ETHICS 145, 147 (1945).
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between state sovereignty and realpolitik55 to its advantage. This sui
generis relationship between the ICC and realpolitik denotes a reality that
Cassese first identified and which is incessantly being ignored: while judicial enforcement must be the center stage of international criminal law, it
must run parallel to political action.56 “When it comes to the arrest and
surrender of suspects, the Court is and ought to be as much of a political
actor as a legal one.”57 The Court may in turn spearhead such political
action within its equal role as a political actor and a legal one. Part of this
role is the challenge for the ICC to successfully convince skeptical states of
there being a way to engage with the Court that does not result in an attrition of their sovereignty but in its enrichment. In achieving this goal, the
Court’s potential use of the surrounding political realities may serve as an
ace up its sleeve.
A.

Embrace the Political Game

The Chief Prosecutor of the ICC, Ms. Fatou Bensouda, announced not
long after she took office that the Court would not play the political game,
which is to be left with the UNSC.58 This reflects the general reluctance of
the OTP to engage in political action and diplomacy. It also presents a
difficult path to traverse, where the Court “sits uneasily at the dangerous
intersection of law and politics.”59 But why is this intersection a dangerous
one? Our legal sensors are trained to view Courts as impartial institutions
that apply the law removed from any political considerations or affiliations,
independent from political institutions and processes.60 And indeed this is
the case. Even for the OTP, the Rome Statute provides in Article 42 that the
OTP “shall act independently as a separate organ of the Court” and that
members of the OTP “shall not seek or act on instructions from any external source.”61 During one of her early speeches, the Chief Prosecutor
stated, “independence is the most fundamental component of our legitimacy and work”62 and “in selecting cases the OTP cannot yield to political
considerations or adapt its work according to the peace negotiations timetable. It must always conduct its work on the basis of the law and of the
evidence collected, and act accordingly, in an independent manner.”63
Does the letter of Article 42, which prohibits acting on instructions from
55. Robert Cryer, International Criminal Law vs. State Sovereignty: Another Round?,
16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 979, 980 (2005).
56. Cassese, supra note 11.
57. William W. Burke-White, Bargaining for Arrests at the International Criminal
Court: A Response to Roper and Barria, 21 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 477, 482 (2008).
58. Interview by Till Papenfuss with Fatou Bensouda, Chief Prosecutor, International Criminal Court (Nov. 15, 2012), https://theglobalobservatory.org/2012/11/interview-with-fatou-bensouda-chief-prosecutor-international-criminal-court/.
59. T. Lindberg, A Way Forward with the International Criminal Court, 159 POL’Y REV.
15, 15 (2010).
60. Id. at 16.
61. Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 42.
62. Fatou Bensouda, Reflections From the International Criminal Court Prosecutor, 45
W. RESERVE J. INT’L L. 505, 507 (2012).
63. Id.
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external sources,64 presuppose that case selection and ultimately the issuing of arrest warrants cannot be influenced by consideration of external
parties, or the degree of cooperation to be expected?65
This narrower perception of the functioning of the Court has
presented a yardstick for the ICC so far.66 As an actor within the international landscape, the ICC makes many decisions that are inevitably political.67 To claim that they are not reflects an insulated reality that bears the
risk of weakening the Court. Even though the ICC’s purely judicial organs
ought to be fully independent, the OTP and its arrest and surrender mechanisms are in fact dependent on the cooperation of states.68 This is not to
suggest the extreme that is often raised about how the Court will become a
puppet of states, or only act if their political interests and support are
involved.69 The Court can neither act merely out of political calculation,
nor without consideration of the law. Yet, grounded in law and evidence,
the relevant organs of the Court have to consciously and openly take into
account the political realities that exist in the arrest and surrender system
as well as employ political, tactical, and strategic means and maneuvers to
use them to their advantage.70
First, the OTP enjoys prosecutorial discretion, that is, the power to
choose if and which investigations to launch, if and which charges to bring,
and who to charge with which crimes.71 In its exercise of such discretion,
the OTP takes the existing political situations into account. For instance,
prosecutorial discretion requires that the decision to select situations and
cases be correlated to society’s interest in exacting criminal punishment.72
International crimes are often committed by highly ranked officials and
64. James A. Goldston, More Candour About Criteria: The Exercise of Discretion by the
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 8 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 383, 396 (2010).
65. See also Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, Policy Paper on Case Selection and Prioritisation 6 (Draft 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/29.02.16_Draft_PolicyPaper-on-Case-Selection-and-Prioritisation_ENG.pdf [hereinafter OTP Policy Paper].
66. Louise Arbour, The Need for an Independent and Effective Prosecutor in the Permanent International Criminal Court, 17 WINDSOR Y.B. ACCESS TO JUST. 207, 217– 19 (1999).
67. This position is supported by a variety of scholars. See Matthew R. Brubacher,
Prosecutorial Discretion Within the International Criminal Court, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 71,
74 (2004); Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics?: Prosecutorial Discretion
and the International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 583, 586– 88 (2007);
Sarah M.H. Nouwen & Wouter G. Werner, Doing Justice to the Political: The International
Criminal Court in Uganda and Sudan, 21 EUR. J. INT’L L. 941, 946 (2010); Robert D.
Sloane, The Expressive Capacity of International Punishment: The Limits of the National
Law Analogy and the Potential of International Criminal Law, 43 STAN. J. INT’L L. 39, 50
(2007).
68. Arbour, supra note 66, at 217.
69. Id. at 218– 19.
70. James A. Goldston expresses the matter as follows: “To date, few have sought to
describe the Prosecutor’s discretionary function as it is: grounded in law and evidence,
but, of necessity, taking into account broader considerations of strategy and policy, even
while refraining from ‘politics’ in the sense of partisanship and/or bias for or against
any interest external to the Court.” Goldston, supra note 64, at 387.
71. See also OTP Policy Paper, supra note 65, at 11.
72. See OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, ICC, POLICY PAPER ON THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE
6– 7 (2007), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/772C95C9-F54D-4321-BF09-7342
2BB23528/143640/ICCOTPInterestsOfJustice.pdf.
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the OTP has to act almost on behalf of an international community of over
100 states.73 Considering the societal interests of people on the ground
but also of their states, the OTP’s decisions cannot but penetrate the fabric
of international politics.74 What is more, when charging a suspect, the
Court has to take into account factors beyond the mere gravity of the
crimes involved and the interest of the international community. In the
charging of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, the OTP stated that an arrest warrant
should be issued because of his imminent release from prison in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”).75 The timing and decision to charge
Lubanga were made with the intention of giving the ICC time to secure
custody of him.76 This not only made sense in terms of timing but also
within the broader political context, as the ICC had to prove its practical
viability by issuing a first arrest warrant in the DRC that was fairly easy to
execute.77
The OTP can also issue arrest warrants publicly or under seal. A
sealed arrest warrant has the advantage that the indictee is not aware of its
existence and would not restrict his or her movement. This could make
domestic apprehensions easier if used strategically78 given that the indictee
could travel unknowingly to a state that is willing to execute the warrant.79
Public arrest warrants, in contrast, draw the attention of the entire international community to the indictee.80 Some indictees have even used public
arrest warrants in rhetoric suggesting that the actual purpose of the ICC is
regime change, as illustrated in the case of Al-Bashir.81 Therefore, next to
the original decision of issuing an arrest warrant, the manner in which it is
issued involves further important political considerations.
Despite the confidentiality of OTP decision-making, these examples
illustrate that it engages in a process that operates within the general political environment without applying the law in a social and political vacuum.82 The OTP can acknowledge similar considerations and map them
out in its prosecutorial strategy. The argument that the prospect for arrest
and surrender is a factor that should be weighed against issuing an arrest
warrant is not new, nor is it foreign in practice.83 If the OTP officially
73. Goldston, supra note 64, at 389.
74. Id.
75. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, ICC, REPORT ON ACTIVITIES PERFORMED DURING THE
FIRST THREE YEARS (JUNE 2003– JUNE 2006) (2006), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/
3YearReport%20_06Sep14.pdf.
76. Goldston, supra note 64, at 394– 95.
77. Id. at 402.
78. Christopher Gosnell, The Request for an Arrest Warrant in Al Bashir: Idealistic
Posturing or Calculated Plan?, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 841, 841– 42 (2008).
79. Id. at 842.
80. Id. at 845.
81. Id.
82. See collected works supra note 68.
83. Morten Bergsmo, Catherine Cisse & Christopher Staker, The Prosecutors of the
International Tribunals: The Cases of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the ICTY and
ICTR, and the ICC Compared, in THE PROSECUTOR OF A PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 121, 135 (Louise Arbour et al. eds., 2000).
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acknowledged such strategies, it would not only increase its transparency
and credibility, but also allow it to openly take into account overlapping
interests of third actors in the arrest and surrender of indictees.84 After all,
an idealistic Court without people to put on trial cannot do much to serve
international justice; yet, a pragmatic Court that recognizes political realities and capitalizes on them can make a difference. The OTP can achieve
this by further distinguishing itself from the other core judicial organs of
the Court that ought to indeed refrain from any political considerations
and instead juxtapose, acknowledge, and embrace its political role.
B.

The Role of the Office of the Prosecutor

A judicial institution such as the ICC that aspires to be permanent in
its jurisdiction and global in its scope requires almost universal membership in order to achieve expedient and full enforcement. Considering that
the ICC is still in its nascent years, such a goal would perhaps be overachieving, despite the Court’s success in acquiring new acceding states
and strategic partners.85 In order to satisfy its broad and difficult mandate, the ICC must expand its number of state parties, deepen the support
it receives from the states that have already accepted its jurisdiction, and
engage in productive dialogue and cooperation with those states that
remain skeptical towards it. Therein lies the biggest opportunity to achieve
the critical international support necessary for eliciting cooperation
regarding enforcement and to increase the levels of global legitimacy that
the Court enjoys.86 The most important tool in this process is the role the
prosecutor can play outside of the courtroom in wresting state cooperation.87 Little has been discussed88 about the dynamics and consequences
of the prosecutor’s actions in the convoluted international political
terrain.89
The prosecutor has considerable range of fluctuation based on the
type of strategy she chooses to adopt in each situation. The two most identifiable ends of the prosecutorial strategy spectrum are that of a conciliatory approach on the one hand and a confrontational approach on the
other.90 But neither of those approaches alone represents a panacea in
84. Gosnell, supra note 78, at 845.
85. Greenawalt, supra note 67, at 584– 85.
86. Victor Peskin, Caution and Confrontation in the International Criminal Court’s
Pursuit of Accountability in Uganda and Sudan, 31 HUM. RTS. Q. 655, 689 (2009).
87. Id. at 691.
88. Notable exceptions include: BENJAMIN N. SCHIFF, BUILDING THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT 194– 247 (2008); Phil Clark, Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC and
Case Selection in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, in COURTING CONFLICT?
JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 37, 37– 44 (Nicholas Waddell & Phil Clark eds.,
2008); Alex de Waal, Darfur, the Court, and Khartoum: The Politics of State Non-Cooperation, in COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 29, 29– 36 (Nicholas
Waddell & Phil Clark eds., 2008); Roper & Barria, supra note 29; William A. Schabas,
Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 731, 749– 53 (2008).
89. Peskin, supra note 86, at 665.
90. Id. at 658, 661.
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resolving the ICC’s enforcement problem. Inasmuch as conciliation may
be important to leverage some cooperation, its continued use when not
followed by the necessary results bears the risk of generating a perception
of a weak prosecutor conceded to state power.91 On the other hand, a
more aggressive strategy against a particular state92 might help obtain
cooperation through international pressure. It may also bring the opposite
effect, complicating diplomatic efforts and igniting a defensive climate.93
Power struggles beyond the courtroom among the prosecutor, the targeted
states, and influential actors in the international community are certainly a
reality that we cannot lightly discount.94 But this represents a stage that
comes prior to the judicial one. Key parties to this stage are the OTP as
well as international actors such as the UN, the EU, and other regional
organizations. All these different actors establish a coordination game
requiring tools that can be made available to the prosecutor by moving even
further towards a policy of positive engagement through indicating that a
constructive relationship with the Court is in their immediate and best
interests. Recognition of potentially complementary and overlapping interests among the actors involved presents the ultimate step in order to seal
this cooperative relationship that may organically alter the current tepid
landscape of international criminal law enforcement.
C.

The International Criminal Court & Its Bargaining Power

Inasmuch as the spotlight has been focused on problems of enforcement in the form of a prisoner’s dilemma game in international criminal
law, little attention has been paid to the coordination game of the bargaining stage.95 For terminological clarity, I understand bargaining situations
to occur when all actors involved may gain from a cooperative deal yet disagree over the specifics of the proposed arrangement. Before states cooperate to enforce a commitment they have agreed to, they often bargain to
decide how, when, and whether they will implement it.96 Regardless of the
substantive domain, problems of international cooperation typically
involve first a bargaining stage (coordination game) and next an enforcement stage (prisoner’s dilemma game or other).97 In spite of their significant conceptual nuances, all theories of compliance recognize one common
theme: bargaining is intrinsic to understanding and achieving coopera91. Id. at 658, 665.
92. See, e.g., Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,
Building a Future on Peace and Justice, Address at International Conference, in
Nuremburg, Germany (June 25, 2007), https://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/4E466E
DB-2B38-4BAF-AF5F-005461711149/143825/LMO_nuremberg_20070625_English.pdf.
93. Peskin, supra note 86, at 665.
94. Id. at 660.
95. James Fearon, Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation, 52 INT’L
ORG. 269, 269 (1998).
96. Id. at 270.
97. Id.
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tion.98 The ICC can therefore strengthen its enforcement regime through a
clearer understanding and appreciation of how its bargaining tools may
affect the arrest and surrender of suspects.99
International Relations literature extensively covers the efficiency of
external economic assistance or sanctions under a carrot and stick game to
promote state cooperation.100 As a result, some attention has been paid to
the bargaining game between the ICC and the relevant state harboring
indicted individuals, or between the ICC and the indicted individuals
directly.101 Yet little reference has been made to the Court’s bargaining
leverage that can be used to attract key global actors in the regional and
global political power play to affect arrest and surrender. This is likely due
to the, oftentimes accurate, perception that those key actors appear vocally
opposed to the ICC.102 But even actors with opposed preferences can
reach a mutually beneficial deal if the outcome of disagreement is sufficiently unattractive, if their interests overlap, or if both factors were to
occur.103 For this reason, there are instances where the ICC, but also key
regional and global actors, will incur some utility gain by bringing indictees to justice despite their other possible differing preferences.104 If the
ICC is unable to try a suspect, it cannot administer justice and thus risks
its legitimacy within the international community.105 Powerful global and
regional actors on the other hand might have a direct interest in facilitating
conflict solutions in situations that involve those indicted by the ICC.106
While there may never be a perfect overlap between the two, that is to say
global/regional actors may not always be interested in getting involved in
all the situations pursued by the ICC, this by no means nullifies the utility
to be gained by both parties when such an overlap is indeed identified and
pursued.
The OTP, in order to establish the possible ways available to facilitate
and increase arrests, needs to assess the means at its disposal. An important distinction to make is one between the cases where the situation state
is unwilling to arrest the indicted individuals,107 and the cases where the
98. See Jeffrey Checkel, The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory, 50
WORLD POL. 324, 334– 35 (1998). See generally KENNETH OYE, COOPERATION UNDER ANARCHY (1986).
99. Kenneth Abbott et al., The Concept of Legalization, 54 INT’L ORG. 401, 416, 419
(2000).
100. The efficacy of economic sanctions is a highly contested issue whose review falls
beyond the scope of the present paper.
101. E.H. Ritter & S. Wolford, Bargaining and the Effectiveness of International Criminal Regimes, 24 J. THEORETICAL POL. 149, 149– 51 (2012).
102. See id. at 149.
103. For general treatments of bargaining models, see ABHINAY MUTHOO, BARGAINING
THEORY WITH APPLICATIONS 2– 3 (1999); James Fearon, Rationalist Explanations for War,
INT’L ORG. 379, 385– 86 (1995); and Ariel Rubinstein, Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining
Model, 50 ECONOMETRICA 97, 97– 109 (1982).
104. See Ritter & Wolford, supra note 101, at 151.
105. Id. at 149– 52.
106. Id. at 151.
107. See Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Mudacumura, ICC-01/04-01/12, Decision on the
Prosecutor’s Application under Article 58 (July 13, 2013), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Cour-
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situation state— due to lack of infrastructure, effective governance, circumstances, or any other obstacle that does not impede the state’s willingness— is unable to enforce the warrant.108 So far, the OTP seems to handle
most arrest and surrender attempts under similar approaches without deference to either the different circumstances or the political incentives of the
different jurisdictional bases. Seeing as how the willingness of states to
comply with ICC arrest warrants is closely connected to the basis of the
Court’s jurisdiction, the two situations are distinct and ought to be treated
as such.
The ICC can exercise jurisdiction for the crimes that fall within the
Rome Statute based on three grounds: (1) a self-referral by a state party;
(2) the Prosecutor’s independent proprio motu power; or (3) a UNSC referral.109 The cases of unwilling situation states are more likely to occur in
the instances of a UNSC referral or where the proceedings are initiated
proprio motu. Situations such as those of Libya and Sudan exemplify this
likely unwillingness of states to comply with the arrest warrants of the
Court.110 Thus, situations of a UNSC referral are likely akin to the type of
non-compliance that the ICTY faced as a tribunal set up by UNSC Resolution,111 due to the unwillingness of states to comply with arrest warrants
issued by a court whose jurisdiction is “forced upon them.”112 In this type
of cases, external pressure in the form of positive or negative inducements
may be more successful in exerting compliance with arrest warrants. In a
similar tradition with inducements,113 condemnation and reputational
tRecords/CR2012_07502.pdf. See generally Prosecutor v. Sylvestre Mudacumura, ICC01/04-01/12, Case Information Sheet (Feb. 24, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/
PIDS/publications/MudacumuraEng.pdf; Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir,
ICC-02/05-01/09, Case Information Sheet (Mar. 26, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/albashir/Documents/AlBashirEng.pdf; Prosecutor v. Abdel Raheem Muhammad
Hussein, ICC-02/05-01/12, Case Information Sheet (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.icccpi.int/darfur/hussein/Documents/HusseinEng.pdf; Prosecutor v. Ahmad Muhammad
Harun and Ali Muhammad Ali Abd– Al-Rahman, ICC-02/05-01/07, Case Information
Sheet (Mar. 25, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/harunkushayb/Documents/
HarunKushaybEng.pdf.
108. Prosecutor v. Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti, ICC-02/04-01/05, Case Information
Sheet (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.icc-cpi.int/uganda/kony/Documents/KonyEtAlEng
.pdf. The proceedings against Raska Lukwiya were only terminated due to his death
before he could be arrested. Raska Lukwiya, Case No.ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision to
Terminate the Proceedings Against Raska Lukwiya (July 11, 2007), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2007_03469.pdf.
109. Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 13, 14, 15.
110. See Dapo Akande, The Effect of Security Council Resolutions and Domestic Proceedings on State Obligations to Cooperate with the ICC, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 299, 305
(2010).
111. The ICTY was established by UN Security Council Resolution 827 using its
mandate under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. See S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 2 (May 25, 1993).
112. Andrea K. Talentino, Perceptions of Peacebuilding: The Dynamic of Imposer and
Imposed Upon, 8 INT’L STUD. PERSP. 152, 153 (2007).
113. See JACK DONELLY, REALISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 18 (2000); Jon Elster,
Rationality, Morality and Collective Action, 96 ETHICS 136, 139 (1985); Steen Scheuer,
Presentation at Roskilde University 5th Conference of the International Association for
Critical Realism: The Social Dimension of Rational Choice— a Critical and Realist View
of Theories of Motivation and Agency at Work (Aug. 17– 19, 2001).
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damage114 towards non-compliant states may serve as auxiliary tools to
increase compliance.
1.

Situation State Unwilling: Inducements & Reputational Sanctions

In compliance theory, instrumentalist approaches are inspired by and
find their place primarily in the realist tradition of international relations.115 In accordance with these approaches, the sole driving force of
states, including in instances of compliance, is state interests.116 States
only comply with international norms and rules when it is in line with
their interests to do so, and are willing to abandon their international law
obligations if they have an overriding interest.117 This is the primary interpretative lens used to understand the initial bad record of compliance with
arrest warrants issued by the ICTY. The ICTY has undergone two distinct
periods regarding its capability to apprehend suspects. During its first
period of operation until the end of the 1990s, it was particularly ineffective in procuring state cooperation despite a Chapter VII UNSC Resolution118 calling for full cooperation, including the arrest and surrender of
suspected individuals.119 In the case of former Yugoslavia, neither the
states in question nor their population considered it in their interest to
114. Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L.
REV. 1822, 1838– 39 (2002).
115. Id.
116. JOHN M. HOBSON, THE STATE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 60 (2000); Anne L.
Herbert, Cooperation in International Relations: A Comparison of Keohane, Haas and
Franck, 14 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 221, 226 (1996); Robert O. Keohane, International Relations and International Law: Two Topics, 38 HARV. INT’L L.J. 487, 487– 88 (1997); Onuma
Yasuaki, International Law in and with International Politics: The Functions of International Law in International Society, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 105, 126– 28 (2003).
117. DAVID ARMSTRONG ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 78
(2012).
118. S.C. Res. 827, ¶ 4 (May 25, 1993) ( “[The Council] [d]ecides that all States shall
cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its organs in accordance with the
present resolution and the Statute of the International Tribunal and that consequently
all States shall take any measures necessary under their domestic law to implement the
provisions of the present resolution and the Statute, including the obligation of States to
comply with requests for assistance or orders issued by a Trial Chamber under Article
29 of the Statute”). But see RACHEL KERR, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA: AN EXERCISE IN LAW, POLITICS, AND DIPLOMACY 38 (Oxford Univ.
Press 2004) (“Beyond condemnation, nothing concrete has been done by the Security
Council to punish non-compliance.”); Nancy Amoury Combs, Copping a Plea to Genocide: the Plea Bargaining of International Crimes, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 2, 67– 68 (2002)
(arguing that “[t]he President of the ICTY has made eleven reports to the Security Council regarding lack of state cooperation,” all of which received statements that a certain
country’s actions are “deplorable”). The one possible exception to this issue of noncompliance is UNSC Resolution 1022. See S.C. Res. 1022 (Nov. 22, 1995). Prior to the
creation of the ICTY, multiple economic sanctions had been placed on the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). After the FRY signed the General Framework Agreement
for Peace the sanctions were suspended. Resolution 1022 stated that if the FRY failed to
meet its obligations under the agreement, however, the sanctions would go back into
effect after five days. But when the FRY did not comply, even after multiple notices to the
UNSC, the sanctions were not reinstated.
119. See Theodor Meron, Answering for War Crimes: Lessons from the Balkans, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 2, 2 (1997).
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arrest what were viewed as “hometown-heroes” or people in their social
circle or interest group.120 In the instances where a state does not comply
with its obligations due to contrary interests, the main way to enforce compliance under the realist lens is through coercive action by third states121
to achieve a shift of the interests of non-complying states towards
compliance.
One of the tactics third states may employ to achieve this shift of interests are inducements, or what in other words resembles the “carrot” in a
carrot and stick game. To induce Croatia’s compliance, the ICTY coordinated with the United States and the EU in a “push and pull” approach
where positive and negative inducements were used interchangeably to
yield the arrest of all Croatian indictees.122 The United States provided
bilateral financial and military assistance with the promise of Croatia’s
compliance (carrot),123 while the European Council froze Croatia’s accession process after the ICTY Chief Prosecutor had issued a negative assessment of Croatian cooperation (stick).124 These kinds of inducements may
be either positive or negative.125
Positive inducements usually take the form of assurances that a state
is to receive if it complies with its obligations.126 In the case of the ICTY,
the initial stalemate regarding its arrests record was eventually broken.127
During the 2000s in its second period, the ICTY saw a developing shift in
state cooperation and a significant boost in its bargaining power, leading to
the arrest and surrender of all 161 indictees.128 This infallible compliance
record was achieved, in large part, due to the substantial assistance of third
states as well as International Organizations (“IOs”) and Regional Organizations, the most prominent of which were the United States and the
EU.129 Both the United States and the EU, realizing this divergence
between the interests of the former Yugoslavian states and those of the
ICTY, coupled the arrest and surrender of the indictees with assurances to
grant considerable benefits to them.130
First, the EU ensured the creation of a consistent and fixed link
between arrest and surrender as well as the accession of Serbia and Croatia
120. See Patricia M. Wald, Apprehending War Criminals: Does International Cooperation Work?, 27 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 229, 235 (2012).
121. Richard H. Steinberg, Wanted Dead or Alive: Realism in International Law, in
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
THE STATE OF THE ART 146, 163 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013).
122. CHRISTOPHER K. LAMONT, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND POLITICS OF COMPLIANCE 48– 52 (2010).
123. Id. at 48– 51.
124. Id. at 55.
125. Jana von Stein, The Engines of Compliance, in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART 477, 479 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013).
126. Id.
127. See LAMONT, supra note 122, at 83; The Fugitives, supra note 31.
128. See LAMONT, supra note 122; The Fugitives, supra note 31.
129. LAMONT, supra note 122, at 82– 83, 85.
130. Id. at 82– 85.
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to the EU.131 In tandem, the United States exerted diplomatic pressure
through pressuring the World Bank to grant development aid and supported Serbia’s accession to NATO in order to achieve long-lasting peace
dependent on cooperation.132 Some have argued that compliance with the
ICTY was largely due to the “American Power.”133 Others, like the ICTY
Chief Former Prosecutor Carla del Ponte, suggested that 90% of the ICTY
arrests were achieved due to the EU’s persistence on stalling the accession
process of former Yugoslavian states before all indictees were arrested and
surrendered to the Tribunal.134 Paradigmatically, when Serbian officials
failed to turn over the accused Mladic to the ICTY, the EU suspended the
discussions concerning the “Stabilization and Association Agreement.”135
Within one month the Serbian authorities designed an “action plan” to
actively support the efforts to arrest Mladic.136 Under either tenable position, it was the positive inducements of third states that led to the arrest
and surrender of individuals— either by linking the arrests with financial
gains and development aid conditional upon cooperation, or through
favorable trade agreements and institutional inclusion such as in the EU
and NATO.137
Negative inducements on the other hand usually take the form of
threats or acts to the detriment of a state for its failure to comply with
international law obligations.138 The archetypal negative inducement is
trade sanctions.139 Nonetheless, trade sanctions and their effects have
been heavily criticized,140 in part for indiscriminately hindering the most
vulnerable social groups and for having the potential to aggravate already
dire post-conflict situations.141 Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot have
observed that sanctions only work in 25% of cases, and only under an
extremely limited set of conditions.142 The reason for this is that “the
evolution of the world economy since WWII has been a narrowing of the
circumstances in which unilateral economic leverage may be effectively
applied.”143 More particularly with regard to the goal of arrests, sanctions
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 13.
134. Address of Carla Del Ponte at The Policy Briefing, supra note 13.
135. Victor Peskin & Mieczysław P. Boduszyński, Balancing International Justice in the
Balkans: Surrogate Enforcers, Uncertain Transitions and the Road to Europe, 5 INT’L J.
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 52, 63 (2011).
136. Interview with Carla Del Ponte, Chief Prosecutor, and David Tolbert, Deputy
Prosecutor, ICTY, in The Hague (July 12, 2006).
137. Alessandro Minuto Rizzo, NATO Deputy Secretary General, Keynote Speech at
Diplomatic Academy, Belgrade (Dec. 19, 2006), http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/
2006/s061219a.htm.
138. See DAVID A. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 20 (Princeton Univ. Press 1985).
139. Id. at 41– 42.
140. See GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER ET AL., ECONOMIC SANCTIONS RECONSIDERED: HISTORY
AND CURRENT POLICY 1, 71, 114 (Inst. for Int’l Econ. 1990).
141. See Robert A. Pape, Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work, 22 INT’L. L. SEC. 90,
93, 107, 110 (1997).
142. See HUFBAUER, supra note 140, at 71.
143. Id. at 114.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-3\CIN301.txt

540

unknown

Seq: 20

13-APR-17

Cornell International Law Journal

15:42

Vol. 49

are unlikely to facilitate them. In order for sanctions to be effective here,
they would need to be backed by a near-total amount of states in a world
where most major powers such as China and Russia have been opposed to
them particularly regarding human rights violations or war crimes.144
This, combined with their veto holding power in the UNSC, makes it
unlikely that they would agree to a sanctioning regime, let alone implement
one.
Other types of negative inducements may be more fitting for the purposes of the ICC arrest and surrender requests in the form of targeted, also
known as “smart,” sanctions.145 Measures targeted towards individuals
such as travel bans or asset freezing may prove more effective.146 For
instance, in the case of Al-Bashir, third states diplomats sabotaged his
anticipated visits by canceling, rescheduling, or relocating meetings thus
putting a detriment to his ability to engage effectively in multilateral diplomacy.147 The lack even of such negative inducements has proved problematic, as in the case of Al-Bashir’s unhindered traveling, which has caused
not only a sense of inaction on the part of ICC member states but also
cynicism towards the Court.148 Travel bans may then prove effective in the
144. See Pape, supra note 141, at 106.
145. See C. Joy Gordon, Smart Sanctions Revisited, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 315, 315
(2011).
146. Id.
147. UN Members: Oppose Al-Bashir’s Visit, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 18, 2013, 6:51
AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/18/un-members-oppose-al-bashirs-visit.
148. See Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-109, Decision informing
the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of the States Parties to the Rome
Statute about President Omar Al-Bashir’s Recent Visit to the Republic of Chad (Aug. 27,
2010), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2010_05769.pdf (noting that President Al Bashir recently visited Chad and Kenya); see also Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case
No. ICC-02/05-01/09-132, Decision requesting observations about Omar Al-Bashir’s
recent visit to the Republic of Chad, at 4, 5– 6 (Aug. 18, 2011), https://www.icc-cpi.int/
CourtRecords/CR2011_12351.pdf (describing the background of President Al-Bashir’s
visits to Chad, explaining that he was there from August 7– 8, 2011 to attend the inauguration ceremony for Idriss Deby, stating that there are allegations that President Al
Bashir traveled to Chad twice without being arrested, and asking that Chad respond
with an explanation for their failure to comply with the Rome Statute no later than September 9, 2011); Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-129, Decision
informing the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties to the
Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir’s recent visit to Djibouti, at 3 (May 12, 2011),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_05772.pdf (explaining that “according
to the media information available, Omar Al Bashir had attended the inauguration ceremony of Djibouti’s President Ismael Omar Guellch on May 8, 2011”); Prosecutor v. Al
Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-119, Transmission of the reply from the Republic of
Kenya, ¶¶ 1– 4 (Oct. 29, 2010), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2010_09219
.pdf; Julian Borger, Court Censures Commonwealth Chief as Rift Deepens over War Crimes
Suspects: Sharma ‘Questions Duty’ of States to Hand Over to ICC: Row Began over Kenya
Refusal to Arrest Bashir, GUARDIAN, Oct. 28, 2010, at 22 (reporting that President Al
Bashir caused an “uproar” by traveling to Kenya, an ICC signatory); Press Release, African Union, On the Decision of the Pre-Trial Chamber of the ICC Informing the UN
Security Council and the Assembly of the State Parties to the Rome Statute about the
Presence of President Omar Hassan Al Bashir of the Sudan in the Territories of the
Republic of Chad and the Republic of Kenya (Aug. 29, 2010), http://www.iccnow.org/
documents/PRDecisionPretrialICCinformingUNSC_Al Bashir_29Aug2010_en.pdf (argu-
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short or long term as they may severely isolate the indicted governmental
officials from the international community, possibly cap their re-election
in situations where democracy or some sort of representative state of
affairs has been restored, or force them to resign from power.149
Asset freezes, on the other hand, refer to tracing and blocking funds of
certain individuals or governments that are located in international banking institutions.150 Asset freezing has been used before under UNSC
Chapter VII Resolutions through the UNSC’s authority to give effect to its
decisions when necessary by engaging in economic interruption.151 The
UNSC has also urged states to individually impose asset freezes against
individuals as well as nations that aided individuals indicted by international courts and tribunals, particularly the ICTY.152 Asset freezes are
unique in their ability to further isolate persons indicted by the ICC, to
serve as an effective penalty even if such persons evade justice, and to force
them to surrender themselves to the ICC.153 They also have the ability to
bypass most problems of UNSC multilateralism as these “sanctions would
be targeted at specific individuals, not governments” and would thus “seem
to be easier to gain support of the members of the Security Council,” avoiding veto.154 Asset freezes may prove to be a promising negative inducement in improving the enforcement record of ICC arrest warrants.
Additionally, withdrawing a positive inducement through the suspension
of financial support, development aid, or accession talks with regard to IOs
and Regional Organizations may be an effective negative inducement as in
the situation of the EU and Croatia regarding the ICTY.155
Reputation is another factor identified as connected to compliance
with international law.156 Lack of compliance with international law may
result in the reputational damage of the recalcitrant states.157 This would
in turn have the effect of other states becoming less willing to cooperate
and enter in favorable agreements with the non-compliant state both due to
ing that as a neighbor of Sudan, it is important for Chad to engage Sudan to ensure
peace and stability).
149. See David Cortright & George A. Lopez, Targeted Sanctions: Lessons from the
1990s, in SMART SANCTIONS: THE NEXT STEPS— THE DEBATE ON ARMS EMBARGOES AND
TRAVEL SANCTIONS WITHIN THE ‘BONN-BERLIN PROCESS’ 19, 28– 29, 35 (Michael Brzoska
ed., 2001).
150. See id. at 26– 27, 35.
151. U.N. Charter art. 41; see S.C. Res. 1503 (Aug. 28, 2003); see, e.g., S.C. Res. 1267,
¶ 4(b) (Oct. 15, 1999) (subsequently modified by S.C. Res. 1333 (2000), 1363 (2001),
1388 (2002), 1390 (2002), 1452 (2002), 1455 (2003), 1526 (2004), 1617 (2005), 1735
(2006)).
152. Id.
153. Michael P. Scharf, The Tools for Enforcing International Criminal Justice in the
New Millennium: Lessons from the Yugoslavia Tribunal, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 925, 945
(2000).
154. Id.
155. See, e.g., R. Jeffrey Smith, Secret Meetings Foiled Karadzic Capture Plan, WASH.
POST, Apr. 23, 1998, at A32.
156. See, e.g., Guzman, supra note 114, at 1861– 62; see also LOUIS HENKIN, HOW
NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 52 (1979).
157. HENKIN, supra note 156, at 52; Guzman, supra note 114, at 1861– 62.
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possible condemnation of their international law violation as well as the
lack of trust prompted by non-complying behavior.158 Non-compliance
may also have a reputational cross-effect.159 Acts contrary to international
law in one area such as non-compliance with ICC arrest warrants may have
a negative effect on the state’s overall reputation, decreasing the willingness of other states to engage in cooperative or diplomatic relations with
that state in general.160 Another way to interpret compliance with ICTY’s
arrest warrants is the former Yugoslavian states’ intentions to engender a
reputational shift and regain a good reputation through normalizing their
standing within the international community and their accession to IOs
and Regional Organizations.161
Rational choice theory and the workings of ICCTs are able to provide
further insight on when inducements may be used most effectively. As a
general matter, inducements ought to be applied until a tipping point is
reached and passed, where the interest to disregard an arrest warrant is
lesser than the interest to comply.162 From a rational choice analysis, the
state’s government acting with individual agency as a rational actor will
cease non-compliance when its cost-benefit analysis indicates that compliance is more beneficial than non-compliance.163 In addition, inducements
are more effective when applied simultaneously by multiple actors such as
third states, IOs, or Regional Organizations as the benefit or loss becomes
more significant.164 The Charles Taylor case also reinforces this point.
Charles Taylor had enjoyed safe haven in Nigeria for three years between
2003 and 2006.165 It wasn’t until the coordinated efforts of the United
Kingdom, United States, and Liberia, that capitalized on Nigeria’s President Obasanjo’s need for international support for reelection, debt relief,
and a White House meeting, that led to Obasanjo’s decision to surrender
Taylor in March 2006.166 The well-coordinated inducements by three
states as well as the support of civil society managed to shift the interests of
Nigeria and its President to bring about Taylor’s arrest.167
2.

Situation State Willing but Unable

Another scenario involves states that are willing to arrest but lack the
capacity to do so. This situation could emerge either after a self-referral or
158. See ANDREW T. GUZMAN, HOW INTERNATIONAL LAW WORKS: A RATIONAL CHOICE
THEORY 33 (2008); Rachel Brewster, Reputation in International Relations and International Law Theory, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF
THE ART 524, 527– 28 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013).
159. See GUZMAN, supra note 158, at 100– 06.
160. Id.
161. Brewster, supra note 158, at 528.
162. GUZMAN, supra note 158, at 33– 41; Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, On
Compliance, 47 INT’L ORG. 175, 203 (1993).
163. GUZMAN, supra note 158, at 33– 41.
164. See, e.g., Richard Dicker, Ramping Up Strategies for ICC Arrests: A Few Lessons
Learned, ICC FORUM, http://iccforum.com/arrest (last visited Sept. 10, 2016).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Id.
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where the internal infrastructure of a state, including its law enforcement,
intelligence, and judicial capabilities, are insufficient to successfully pursue the indictee.168 To address this impasse, I argue that the Court ought
to seek the help of third states and/or IOs or Regional Organizations to
facilitate the enforcement of arrest warrants. The, albeit short, history of
the ICC has brought forward a case selection strategy that was not initially
considered and is not explicitly referred to in the Rome Statute. Even
though Article 14 of the Rome Statute deals with referrals of a situation by
a state party, the Court designers could hardly have expected that out of
the nine situations under investigation by the Court, four would be selfreferrals.169 Most of these instances come from governments that have an
interest to pursue certain individuals that usually belong to rebel groups
fighting against them.170 In the situation of Uganda for instance, the OTP
struck a deal with the government to secure its cooperation with the promise of only prosecuting the insurgents and forego any government officials
and military.171 The premise in this scenario, therefore, is that the government wants to arrest the indictees but does not have the means to do so.
Managerial theories in international relations assert that states generally seek to comply with their international obligations but at times fail to
do so due to reasons of limited capacity.172 In order to induce compliance,
efforts must be focused on building internal capacity and strengthening
domestic institutions and administrative structures.173 The example of
Uganda further demonstrates one of these difficulties. Joseph Kony, the
leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”) has been at large while the
Uganda government has professed its inability to control certain parts of
168. See LAMONT, supra note 122, at 41, 83; Payam Akhavan, The Lord’s Resistance
Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of the First State Referral to the International Criminal
Court, 99 AMERICAN J. INT’L L. 403, 415; Chayes & Chayes, On Compliance, supra note
162, at 188, 193– 94.
169. To date, four State Parties to the Rome Statute— Uganda, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African Republic, and Mali— have referred situations occurring on their territories to the Court. In addition, the Security Council has referred the
situation in Darfur, Sudan, and the situation in Libya— both non-State Parties. On
March 31, 2010, Pre-Trial Chamber II granted the Prosecution authorization to open an
investigation proprio motu in the situation of Kenya. In addition, on October 3, 2011,
Pre-Trial Chamber III granted the Prosecutor’s request for authorization to open investigations proprio motu into the situation in Côte d’Ivoire. See Situations under investigation, INT’L CRIM. CT., https://www.icc-cpi.int/pages/situations.aspx (last visited Sep. 10,
2016).
170. See Phil Clark, Chasing Cases: The ICC and Politics of State Referral in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND COMPLEMENTARITY 1180, 1186– 87, 1197.
171. Clark, supra note 170, at 1198– 1202; see Akhavan, supra note 168.
172. Chayes & Chayes, On Compliance, supra note 162, at 188; see ORAN R. YOUNG,
COMPLIANCE AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY: A THEORY WITH INTERNATIONAL APPLICATIONS 105– 06
(1979); Abram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement:
State Behavior under Regulatory Treaties, 7 NEGOT. J. 311, 312 (1991).
173. See YOUNG, supra note 172, at 128– 34; Chayes & Chayes, On Compliance, supra
note 162, at 193– 94; Chayes & Chayes, Compliance Without Enforcement, supra note
172, at 318, 325– 27.
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the state that are under the LRA’s control.174 What is more, the dense
jungle of Uganda and the neighboring states make collecting intelligence of
Kony’s whereabouts by Ugandan Officers almost impossible.175 Since
2008, the United States, which is notably not a party to the Rome Statute,
has provided personnel to train Ugandan soldiers, as well as intelligence
and financial assistance to capture Kony.176 In a somewhat similar fashion, the Croatian government relied on United Kingdom intelligence and
support from the MI6 to track down and ultimately arrest and surrender to
the ICTY the former Croatian General Ante Gotovina.177 These examples
demonstrate two major points: first, that third states and particularly those
technologically, financially, or geopolitically advanced are in a position to
help with arresting indictees. Second, this help does not necessarily need
to come from states party to the Rome Statute. What potential then do
third states and IOs have to facilitate arrests either on their own initiative
or through the OTP making effective use of its diplomatic capabilities?
3.

The Establishment of a Diplomatic Arm

Article 87(5) of the Rome Statute envisions the possibility of the Court
inviting assistance from states that are not party to the Rome Statute.178
Non-state parties may enter into cooperative engagements with the Court
on an ad hoc basis to offer various forms of assistance. In the language of
treaty law, treaties are binding only on state parties and create no rights or
obligations for a third party without its consent.179 In the case of Article
87(5), the word “invite” is indicative of the voluntary nature of non-state
party cooperation.180 This voluntary nature becomes somewhat
blurred,181 however, when the obligation to cooperate with the ICC derives
174. John Ahere & Grace Maina, The Never-Ending Pursuit of the Lord’s Resistance
Army: An Analysis for the Elimination of the LRA, POL’Y & PRAC. BRIEF (African Ctr. For
Constructive Resol. Disputes (ACCORD), South Africa), Mar. 2013, at 1, 6.
175. Richard Lough, Ugandan troops play jungle cat and mouse with Kony, REUTERS
(Apr. 20, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-uganda-kony-idUSBRE83J1012012
0420.
176. See ALEXIS ARIEFF ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42094, THE LORD’S RESISTANCE
ARMY: THE U.S. RESPONSE 9– 10 (2015), http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42094.pdf.
177. See LAMONT, supra note 122, at 41.
178. See Banteka, supra note 16, at 453, 459.
179. “Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states the pacta
tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt principle: a treaty does not create either obligations or
rights for a third state without its consent.” Id. at 459 n.16. There may however, be
some customary law obligations not to actively hinder accountability for international
crimes. See G.A. Res. 3074, at 79 (Dec. 3, 1973) (“States shall not take any legislative or
other measures which may be prejudicial to the international obligations they have
assumed in regard to the detection, arrest, extradition and punishment of persons guilty
of war crimes and crimes against humanity.”).
180. Banteka, supra note 16, at 460.
181. The public record reveals at least one formal request for assistance from the ICC
to the United States with respect to the situation in Darfur. See Press Release, Sean
McCormack, U.S. Dep’t of State (July 14, 2008); see also Clint Williamson, Ambassadorat-Large for War Crimes Issues, U.S. Dep’t of State, Remarks at the Century Foundation
on Reassessing the International Criminal Court: Ten Years Past Rome (Jan. 13, 2009).
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from the authority of the UNSC acting under its Chapter VII powers.182 By
virtue of Article 25 of the UN Charter, such UNSC Resolutions are binding
upon all UN member states thereby rendering UNSC referrals to the ICC
equally authoritative upon all UN member states.183
This Article restricts its scope to addressing only the instances where
there has been no UNSC referral to the Court. Such instances ought to be
analyzed under a different set of UN Charter obligations, including their
shortcomings. While key non-state parties to the Rome Statute voice several unique concerns with regard to their engagement with the ICC, there is
arguably a large area of overlap between their national interests and the
ICC agenda. State interests are after all far from static and are subject to
constant change, something that can be of great use to the ICC in this type
of dynamic. For instance, a policy of positive cooperation with the ICC
would give third states the considerable opportunity to become part of the
shaping of the ICC agenda and how it conforms within the context of their
interests. The pursuit of international justice is a unifying theme, which
encompasses multiple operational pillars and actors. The ICC is only one
pillar of a bigger system that includes diplomacy, institutional action led by
the UNSC, local political and judicial mechanisms, and perhaps even military action.184 Facilitating the work of the ICC does not necessarily have
to impair the pursuit of the same or other interests under the rest of available options; if anything, facilitation should complement it.
The ICC bears significant legal and political tools to use towards this
end despite the lack of a tangible enforcement power of its own. The most
important of these tools is the role that the Prosecutor and her Office can
play outside of the courtroom in wresting state cooperation.185 While the
acts of the Prosecutor are key to the development and success of the ICC,
little attention has been paid186 to the dynamics and consequences of the
Prosecutor’s actions in the convoluted international political rink. Yet it is
at these decisive junctures of arrests enforcement that the Prosecutor is
presented with the ultimate opportunity to infiltrate the political landscape. By doing so, she may employ strategies that can directly impact
state cooperation and the overall pursuit of international criminal justice.
Power struggles beyond the courtroom between the Prosecutor, situation
countries, and the influential actors in the international community cannot
182. Zhu Wenqi, On Co-operation by States Not Party to the International Criminal
Court, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 87, 89– 91 (2006).
183. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 2 (Mar. 31, 2005).
184. Banteka, supra note 16, at 460 (citing Tod Lindberg, A Way Forward with the
International Criminal Court, 159 POL’Y REV. 15, 15 (2010)).
185. Id. at 461.
186. Notable exceptions include Phil Clark, Law, Politics and Pragmatism: The ICC
and Case Selection in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda, in COURTING CONFLICT?: JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 37 (Nicholas Waddell & Phil Clark eds.,
2008); Alex de Waal, Darfur, the Court, and Khartoum: The Politics of State Non-Cooperation, in COURTING CONFLICT?: JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 29 (Nicholas Waddell
& Phil Clark eds., 2008); Roper & Barria, supra note 29; and William A. Schabas,
Prosecutorial Discretion v. Judicial Activism at the International Criminal Court, 6 J. INT’L
CRIM. JUST. 731, 749– 53 (2008). See SCHIFF, supra note 88.
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be discounted lightly.187 While the ICC is concentrated on rendering judicial outcomes within the four walls of a courtroom in The Hague, powerful
international actors such IOs (UN, EU, AU, et al.) and key powerful states
are all part of a world that comes prior to the judicial one.188 This leads to
a coordination game that necessitates political leverage, bargaining, and
the adoption of a negotiation strategy by the Prosecutor in order to achieve
desired results.189 In this struggle for cooperation, the Prosecutor is
bound to need all the tools she can get from key global and regional actors
in order to secure compliance from recalcitrant states.
Seeing international criminal justice as such a process compels the
OTP to exercise diplomatic action and engage in a form of judicial diplomacy. This could be facilitated through the establishment of a diplomatic
arm within the OTP in order to enhance its relationship with current member states and to build trust and understanding between the Office and
non-member states. This practice should not strike us as odd given that
the OTP is already engaged through its day-to-day operations in high-level
politics: its engagement with the UNSC in cases of referrals; the political
decisions of governments with regard to arrests; the political consequences
of arrests of indicted individuals, who are usually key actors in the political
fermentation of their regions; and everything in between.190 After all, a
Prosecutor’s work is by its very nature “politicized” in that her purpose is
to apprehend individuals and secure convictions while the Court as a
whole is expected to be neutral and impartial.191 Even though the ICC as a
whole is and ought to be non-political, independent, fair, and impartial, the
very role of the OTP requires a set of maneuvers in order to fulfill its mandate that have very little to do with the judicial process.
It is for this reason that the OTP would benefit from improving its
institutional capacity in order to be able to analyze the political situations
at hand and engage in constructive judicial diplomacy both in situation
countries as well as in the global political sphere.192 In the context of
arrests, the OTP ought to incorporate a proactive approach in order to analyze and create strategies for using realpolitik in its favor. More practically,
the OTP could achieve this by bringing in people with political and diplomatic expertise, who can analyze political situations and have experience
both in specific regions, situation countries, and global politics. This will
also facilitate the OTP to play a significant role in the creation of a clear
and consistent policy agenda for the international community as a whole
with regard both to indicted individuals as well as states that may contribute to their apprehension.
187. Banteka, supra note 16, at 461.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 462.
191. Id.
192. Question on Arrest: What more can be done to secure the arrest and surrender of
persons subject to arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court?, ICC FORUM
(Feb. 13, 2014), http://iccforum.com/arrest.
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The OTP has taken an important step towards this direction in its
2012– 2015 Strategic Plan through the organizational changes it has
planned, especially with regard to the Jurisdiction, Complementarity, and
Cooperation Division (“JCCD”) and the Investigations Division (“ID”).193
The focus of the JCCD on managing strategic international contacts is
moving towards the direction of establishing a more concrete role for the
JCCD as that diplomatic arm the OTP needs in order to fully seize its tools
as a political actor in the field of arrests. The next step in this would be the
full engagement of the JCCD and the Prosecutor in embracing the political
context within which the OTP operates and in improving its diplomatic
leverage. This may well include relationship building in order to improve
trust between the Court and state parties, examining situations of interest
alignment between the OTP and states (whether parties or non-parties), as
well as bargaining with governments that may advance the OTP’s task in
securing arrests.
The singular nature of the ICC combined with the political dynamic of
the OTP would benefit from a strategic model which integrates its judicial
mandate with political cognizance. Under this model, the Prosecutor bears
significant leverage in productively utilizing her bargaining power in order
to increase cooperation. By recognizing the importance of key actors in the
arrest and surrender coordination game, the OTP will be able to set and
advance its agenda to gain the necessary leverage, allowing it to successfully carry out its mandate. This would not in fact politicize the Court but
enable it to utilize all possible tools available without compromising its
rigid legal standards.
Through its diplomatic unit, the OTP will be able to better assess the
willingness and capabilities of member states to apply appropriate measures to ensure compliance either before issuing an arrest warrant or in
instances of state noncompliance with one. The OTP could collect information about the likelihood of arrest, plan strategies with higher likelihood
of success, and coordinate and combine the different capabilities and preferences of states towards non-compliant states. Even though the OTP has
no formal say in the state or IO decision regarding the assumption of measures towards arrest and surrender, it may influence the decision-making
process through successful engagement with their representatives for
issues of cooperation.194 A diplomatic arm of the OTP would also be given
the ability to informally engage with relevant representatives and thus be
involved in the bargaining process with situation states.
The OTP would also have the capacity to build strong cooperation and
coordination within a network of activist states in order to promote compliance with arrest warrants. There is a core group of states that is traditionally very active in responding to the existence and punishment of
international crimes committed outside their borders. I refer to these
193. OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR, INT’L CRIMINAL COURT, STRATEGIC PLAN JUNE
2012– 2015, at 16 (2013).
194. Cedric Ryngaert, The International Prosecutor: Arrest and Detention 21 (Leuven
Ctr. for Glob. Governance Stud., Working Paper No. 24, 2009).
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states as “activist” states. For instance, Belgium and Spain have traditionally been very active in triggering their universal jurisdiction in order to put
alleged perpetrators of international crimes before courts long before the
establishment of the ICC.195 The U.S. identity has long included a sense of
responsibility for the prevention and punishment of international
crimes.196 The Netherlands is another example of a state that has incorporated a sense of identity with a proactive approach regarding international
crimes. They have pushed for the creation of international courts and
tribunals, and host most of them with a clear constitutional provision
which promotes the development of an “international rule of law.”197 This
core group of states could harness the influence that stems from their
strong identity in these matters to assist the ICC and the OTP in promoting
compliance with arrest warrants.
4.

The United States as a Case Study of a Non-Member State

a.

The ICC— U.S. Cooperation Equation

President Barack Obama entered office198 with a pledge to mitigate
the hostile relationship between the United States and the ICC of the previous administration through reviewing and redrafting the U.S. policy
towards the Court.199 The issue of cooperation with the ICC was a central
element of the stocktaking component during the ICC Review Conference.200 There the United States renewed its commitment towards
accountability in instances of alleged violations that fall within the ICC
jurisdiction, and especially in the situation of Uganda.201 Looking at the
U.S. policy comparatively throughout the past two administrations, Harold
195. See, e.g., Arrest Warrant of April 11, 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Belg.), Judgment,
2002 I.C.J. Rep. 121 (Feb. 14); Regina v. Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate,
Ex Parte Pinochet Ugarte [1999] 1 AC 147 (HL) (Eng.).
196. ARIEFF ET AL., supra note 176, at 1.
197. Gw. [Constitution] art. 90 (Neth.).
198. Nora Boustany, Official Floats Possibility of Assistance to Hague Court, WASH.
POST, (June 12, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/
06/11/AR2007061102347.html; Jess Bravin, U.S. Accepts International Criminal Court,
WALL ST. J., (Apr. 26, 2008), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB120917156494046579;
Jess Bravin, U.S. Warms to Hague Tribunal, WALL ST. J., (June 14, 2006, 12:01 AM), http:/
/www.wsj.com/articles/SB115024503087679549; Sue Pleming, U.S. Takes More Pragmatic View of World Court, REUTERS, (May 7, 2008), http://www.amicc.org/docs/5-72008_Reuters.pdf; Taylor War Crimes Trial Worries West Africa, NPR (Apr. 6, 2006),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5327167.
199. See AM. SOC’Y INT’L L., U.S. POLICY TOWARD THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT:
FURTHERING POSITIVE ENGAGEMENT (2009); Megan A. Fairlie, The United States and the
International Criminal Court Post-Bush: A Beautiful Courtship but an Unlikely Marriage,
29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 528, 528– 29 n.2 (2011); Press Release, Robert Wood, Acting
Spokesman, U.S. Dep’t State (Feb. 12, 2009), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/
2009/02/117252.htm.
200. See, e.g., INT’L CRIM. CT., REPORT OF THE BUREAU ON STOCKTAKING: COOPERATION
(2010); INT’L CRIM. CT., STOCKTAKING OF INT’L CRIM. JUST., COOPERATION: [DRAFT] SUMMARY OF THE ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION 7 (2010).
201. See Review Conference of the Rome Statute, Doc. No. RC/9-ENG-15072010,
Pledges, at 18 (July 15, 2010), https://asp.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/18B88265-BC634DFF-BE56-903F2062B797/0/RC9ENGFRASPA.pdf.
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Koh was not wrong to state that under the Obama administration202 the
U.S.– ICC relationship has been “rest from hostility to positive engagement.”203 Perhaps the most remarkable momentums of this cardinal transition in U.S. policy were the February 2011 vote of the United States in
favor of the UNSC resolution referring the situation in Libya to the
Court204 and most notably the lobbying the United States engaged in to
get other states on the Council to support the referral.205 This, of course,
is not to say that the road to a richer engagement with the ICC is without
hurdles. The most important wall the U.S. administration has to pierce is
the domestic political challenges of how a U.S. involvement with the Court
is perceived.206 In order to dilute this controversy, a U.S. policy of cooperation with the ICC that is carefully pursued over time and delivers concrete
substantive benefits to U.S. interests is the best path for developing a relationship with the Court.207
While there are many areas and forms of cooperation between the ICC
and non-state parties, this section focuses on the possibility of a direct
cooperation with the Court on the arrest and surrender of suspects. Having established the lack of obligation for third states to directly assist the
ICC with the exception of a UNSC referral, the question of what a cooperative engagement between the United States and the Court could look like
surfaces. As a matter of international law, the United States is unconstrained in exercising its voluntary right to assist the Court.208 As a matter
of domestic law however, the waters become slightly muddier for two reasons. First, the legislation passed during the George W. Bush administration and more specifically the American Service-Members Protection Act
(“ASPA”)209 restricts cooperation with the ICC, particularly barring the
U.S. government from providing any support to the Court.210 Even though
202. See Hearing on the Nomination of Hillary Rodham Clinton of New York to be Secretary of State before the Sen. Comm. On Foreign Relations, 111th Cong. 66 (2009) (statement of Sen. Hillary Rodham Clinton); see also Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the U.N.,
Statement on Respect for Int’l Humanitarian L. addressed to the President of the Security Council (Jan. 29, 2009).
203. U.S. Engagement, supra note 13.
204. S.C. Res. 1970 (Feb. 26, 2011).
205. Joe Lauria, U.N. Imposes Sanctions on Gadhafi, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 27, 2011), http:/
/www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703796504576169110415048124; Edward
Wyatt, Security Council Calls for War Crimes Inquiry in Libya, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 26, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/27/world/africa/27nations.html?_r=1.
206. See generally Paul W. Kahn, Why The United States Is So Opposed (Dec. 2003),
http://web.uncg.edu/dcl/courses/humanright/paul_kahn.pdf.
207. See Douglas Dunbar, The Obama Administration’s Evolving Policy Toward the
International Criminal Court, AMICC (updated 2011), http://www.amicc.org/docs/
ObamaPolicy.pdf.
208. Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 116.
209. Following two earlier unsuccessful attempts at passing it, ASPA was approved
with strong bipartisan support by both houses of Congress and signed into law by the
President on August 2, 2003. The most relevant provisions of the Act, sections
2004– 2007, contain numerous restrictions on interaction by U.S. Federal or State government entities or courts with the ICC. See National Defense Authorization Act, Pub.
L. No. 107-206, 116 Stat. 820, 902– 05 (2002).
210. See id.
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the ASPA has been relatively declawed, “support” is broadly defined to
include “assistance of any kind, including financial support, transfer of
property, or other material support, services, intelligence sharing, law
enforcement cooperation, the training or detail of personnel, and the arrest
or detention of individuals.”211 On the flipside, with the passage of the socalled Dodd Amendment,212 such restrictions on cooperation do not apply
with respect to efforts in bringing to justice foreign nationals that are
accused of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.213 While
the relationship of the Dodd Amendment vis-à-vis the more restrictive parts
of the ASPA is unclear,214 it is probably safe to argue that they allow for a
case-by-case decision of engagement with the ICC. The forms of such
assistance would therefore have to fall within the permitted range of ASPA,
interpreted widely as read in conjunction with the Dodd Amendment. Second, the United States under the George W. Bush administration215 has
entered into a series of bilateral immunity agreements with multiple ICC
state parties under Article 98 of the Rome Statute. While the rationale of
the United States in securing those agreements was to effectively protect
U.S. citizens from ICC jurisdiction, most of those agreements contain
211. 22 U.S.C. § 7432 (2008).
212. 22 U.S.C. § 7433 (2002). The Dodd Amendment specifically provides that
“[n]othing in this title shall prohibit the United States from rendering assistance to international efforts to bring to justice Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Milosevic, Osama bin
Laden, other members of Al Queda, leaders of Islamic Jihad, and other foreign nationals
accused of genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity.” Id. This aspect of the Act
earned the ASPA. See American Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the
International Criminal Court, Chronology of US Opposition to the International Criminal
Court: From ‘Signature Suspension’ to Immunity Agreements to Darfur (updated 2008),
http://faculty.maxwell.syr.edu/hpschmitz/PSC124/PSC124Readings/USandICCChronology.pdf.
213. 22 U.S.C. § 7433 (2002).
214. See Beth Van Schaack, State Cooperation & the International Criminal Court: A
Role for the United States?, SANTA CLARA L. DIG. COMMONS 1, 8 (2011), http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1615&context=facpubs (quoting Williamson, supra note 181).
We have really relied on the final provision of ASPA, which is sort of this get-outof-jail-free card, which says that nothing in this act shall constrain the [United
States] from doing what’s necessary to bring people to justice for genocide and
other serious crimes. We have used this final provision to license our interaction with the ICC. But it’s [sic] really can be applied on a case by case basis, and
this has allowed us, I think, great latitude on Darfur.
Id.
215. For the position of the Bush administration regarding the Article 98 bilateral
agreements, see generally John R. Bolton, American Justice and the International Criminal
Court, DISAM 28, 29 (2003), http://www.amicc.org/docs/Bolton11_3_03.pdf. As a
point of historic reference, negotiations for the conclusion of bilateral non-surrender
agreements began in the summer of 2002 as part of a major diplomatic campaign. Prior
to it, in April 2002, all U.S. ambassadors were asked to examine whether other nations
were willing to conclude bilateral agreements protecting U.S. nationals from ICC jurisdiction. At the same time, considerable diplomatic and financial pressure was exerted.
See D. McGoldrick, Political and Legal Responses to the ICC, in THE PERMANENT INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 389, 424 (Dominic McGoldrick, Peter
Rowe & Eric Donnelly eds., 2004).
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reciprocal obligations216 equally barring the United States from handing
over citizens of those states to the ICC. Among the currently open situations before the ICC, the Central African Republic (“CAR”), the DRC,
Uganda, and Cote D’ Ivoire have such reciprocal bilateral agreements with
the United States.217 The legality of these agreements has been sharply
contested when the second party to them is a state party to the Rome Statute,218 but a judicial body has never examined their legality domestically
or internationally to this point. The restrictive effect such agreements
could have on U.S. cooperation with the ICC in situations of state parties is
therefore unclear.
While the United States voices several unique concerns regarding its
engagement with the ICC, there is a large and strong area of overlap
between national U.S. interests and the ICC agenda to bring to justice
those responsible for egregious human rights violations. Inasmuch as
domestic U.S. legislation may limit the extent of this potential cooperation,
the same legislation equally allows for certain policy maneuvers. First, a
policy of positive cooperation with the ICC would give the United States
the considerable opportunity of taking part in the shaping of the ICC
agenda and how it conforms within the context of U.S. interests.219 The
current ICC efforts are certainly in line with the United States’ goal of pursuing those responsible for the worst international crimes, however distorted of a picture the past U.S./ICC interactions may have painted of
this.220 Viewing the ICC as part of this bigger system and not as isolated
and unipolar will allow for a cooperation that ultimately brings the United
States into a position to ask what it can do to help the Court.221 Satisfying
216. Not all of the Article 98 treaties entered into by the United States are reciprocal.
See generally Am. Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for Int’l Crim. Ct., US &
the ICC: Bilateral Immunity Agreements, AMICC, https://www.amicc.org/bilateral-immunity-agreements-1 (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
217. See generally Agreement Between the United States of America and Uganda,
U.S.– Uganda, June 12, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 03– 1023 (entered into force Oct. 23, 2003);
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Central African Republic,
C.A.R.– U.S., Jan. 13– 19, 2004, T.I.A.S. No. 04– 119 (entered into force Jan. 19, 2004);
Agreement Between the United States of America and the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, D.R.C.– U.S., Mar. 19, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 03– 722.2 (entered into force July 22,
2003); Agreement Between the United States of America and Cote D’Ivoire, C.I.– U.S.,
June 30, 2003, T.I.A.S. No. 03– 1016 (entered into force Oct. 16, 2003).
218. See Eur. Consult. Ass., Draft Council Conclusions on the International Criminal
Court (Doc. No. 12488/1/02) (Sept. 30, 2002), https://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cmsUpload/ICC34EN.pdf (stating that U.S. agreements are inconsistent with
State Parties’ obligations to the Rome Statute); Kenneth Roth & Richard Dicker, Letter
Urging Continued Resistance to U.S. Impunity Agreements, HUMAN RTS. WATCH (Oct. 21,
2002), https://www.hrw.org/legacy/press/200 (noting that U.S. agreements are illegal
under general international law); see also James Crawford, Philippe Sands & Ralph
Wilde, In the Matter of the Statute of the Intenational [sic] Criminal Court and in the
Matter of Bilateral Agreements Sought by the United States under Article 98(2) of the Statute: Joint Opinion, June 5, 2003, at 2.
219. See Paul C. Szasz, The United States Should Join the International Criminal Court,
A.F. ACAD. J. LEGAL ST. 1, 1– 32 (1998– 99).
220. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 17, art. 5,
221. This shift has been observed as the Obama administration proactively arranged
meetings with ICC officials to discuss the ways in which the U.S. can help the Court. See
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its side of the bargain, the ICC can advance its interests by seizing the
plethora of resources the United States may be in a position to offer, from
operational facilitation and capacity building to intelligence sharing and
diplomatic pressure in apprehending suspects.222 In tandem, the United
States may come to find that such a positive cooperation may turn out to
be particularly effective in seizing utility and maximizing its international
payoffs as a global key actor position it wishes to remain. In practice, there
have already been situations in which cooperation with the ICC as a matter
of policy would advance the U.S. interests. Two obvious examples are the
UNSC referral of the situation in Darfur, and the self-referral of Uganda
regarding the LRA,223 both instances that indubitably fall within the U.S.
strategic interests.224 Such mutually beneficial relationship promises to
ultimately enhance the international justice efforts and restore the United
States to a leadership position in this area.
b.

U.S. Interests in Africa & Indirect Cooperation

While national interests are particularly abstruse and hard to uncover,
the United States has been fairly consistent in its basic strategic pursuits
throughout the recent years despite the different approaches in implementation. A new theme and overarching goal that emanated from the current
geopolitical developments is the renewal of the United States’ status as a
global leader in the present and coming years.225 When it comes to interests of national and international economy, security, and justice, the U.S.
Stephen J. Rapp, U.S. Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes, Statement regarding
stocktaking at the Eighth Resumed Session of the Assembly of States Parties of the ICC
(Mar. 23, 2010). The need for this assistance is strong. See Statement of Beatrice Le
Fraper Du Hellen, Special Advisor to the Prosecutor at the ICC, Seeking Global Justice,
CNN’S AMANPOUR, Mar. 24, 2010, http://archives.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/1003/24/
ampr.01.html (“We have our shopping list ready of requests for assistance . . . from the
American government.”). Unsurprisingly, at the top of the list is a request for U.S. operational support to facilitate the execution of the arrest warrants that have been issued by
the ICC. Id.
222. Amanda Claire Grayson, Is ICC Submission in the Best Interest of US National
Security? A Cost-Benefit Analysis, 1 GLOBAL SEC. STUD. 130, 140 (2010), http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Grayson%20ICC%20TWO.pdf.
223. See Press Release, President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC, U.N. Press Release AFR/821-L/3055 (Jan. 29, 2004),
http://www.un.org/press/en/2004/afr821.doc.htm. On the prosecutor’s focus on LRA
crimes, see also SCHIFF, supra note 88, at 198– 99.
224. On May 24, 2010, President Obama signed into law the LRA Disarmament and
Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, which aims to:
[S]upport stabilization and lasting peace in northern Uganda and areas affected
by the Lord’s Resistance Army through development of a regional strategy to
support multilateral efforts to successfully protect civilians and eliminate the
threat posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army and to authorize funds for humanitarian relief and reconstruction, reconciliation, and transitional justice, and for
other purposes.
Lord’s Resistance Army Disarmament and Northern Uganda Recovery Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-172, 124 Stat. 1209 (2010).
225. See generally U.S. DEP’T OF DEFENSE, SUSTAINING U.S. GLOBAL LEADERSHIP: PRIORITIES FOR 21ST CENTURY DEFENSE (2010), http://archive.defense.gov/news/Defense_Strate
gic_Guidance.pdf.
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strategy focuses on strengthening international institutions and galvanizing collective action as the two ways in which it can pursue national, international, and shared interests.226
State interests are not static and they are subject to constant change
but certain interests are so fundamentally intrinsic to a country’s identity
that can be considered relatively fixed and time resistant. For the United
States, one set of such interests is respect for universal values, human
rights, and an international order that promotes peace, security, and
opportunity.227 While this may not always be an isolated set of interests
pursued, when upheld, it is an integral, decisive, and molding factor of the
U.S. international security policy. This becomes even clearer in light of the
2015 National Security Strategy report which spells out four enduring
national interests: security, prosperity, values, and international order.228
When seen through this prism, each of those interests becomes inextricably linked with the rest, making their pursuit in isolation of one another
effectively futile. The common thread is the need for a realignment of
national action with international partners, both states and institutions,
who share common sets of interests.229
The United States has a renewed interest in gaining and preserving
strong alliances.230 Admittedly, the foundation of both national and international security lies with a state’s relations with its international allies. In
this effort, the United States relies on the American Armed Forces as its
strength with significant bearing.231 In its most recent strategy agenda, the
United States has committed to continue supporting its allies as well as
reinforcing international efforts against potential adversaries.232 In the
field of international justice, the United States has a specific interest in
ending impunity and promoting justice.233 To this end, the United States
aspires to facilitate the rebuilding of national judicial systems and to support the ad hoc, internationalized tribunals, and ICC when in line with
U.S. interests.234 Through an examination of the main U.S. strategic interests, accountability for perpetrators of human rights violations is one
important common area of overlap among the four pillars of strategic
interests.
In pursuing this end of criminal accountability, the position of the
ICC as an integral actor within the international criminal justice system
cannot be overstated. Despite the United States’ reluctance towards the
Court, it is possible to uncover potential engagements with it that the
226. See WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY (2010) http://www.whitehouse
.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
227. Id. at 7.
228. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY 26– 27 (2015), https://www.white
house.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy.pdf.
229. Id. at 23– 24.
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id. at 33.
234. Id.
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United States would feel comfortable supporting. It is true that both the
United States and the ICC are faced with a thin balance when it comes to
their potential cooperation. The United States on the one hand wishes to
be seen as sufficiently independent from the Court and is weary of possible implications with ICC’s mandate.235 The ICC, on the other hand, fears
to be perceived as over politicized, something that could destroy its legacy
as an international judicial institution.236 Admittedly, these are extreme
outcomes albeit with realistic bearing. Cooperation with the ICC does not
necessarily require an active engagement with the Court itself, however. If
the purpose of the ICC is understood as the quest to end impunity and
establish accountability for the four international crimes within its jurisdiction, there are multiple ways in which the United States could facilitate
this goal without directly and actively providing assistance to the ICC yet
remaining in its periphery.
The first way the United States could facilitate international accountability is through capacity building and the enhancement of the domestic
legal systems in relevant states.237 Taking advantage of the principle of
complementarity that gives way to genuine national prosecutions, the
shared goal of the United States and the ICC can be achieved indirectly
without having to necessarily sit at the same table.238 Secondly, the
United States can provide training, equipment, and intelligence assistance
to allied countries in order to facilitate the apprehension of ICC indictees.239 While this does not require a military intervention on the part of
the United States, it offers significant advantage to states located within the
dense African continent in discovering the whereabouts of those wanted by
the ICC. Again, this avoids a direct relationship between the Court and the
United States while at the same time strengthening and preserving its relationships with its allies. Somewhat related to this is the third way in which
the United States can indirectly support the efforts of the ICC and that is
through the exercise of diplomatic pressure or rewards on those states
whose cooperation is key for the apprehension of suspects.240
On the flip side, the United States has political and economic interests
in Africa relating to democratic governance, trade, market infiltration, and
oil.241 Africa is the largest potential upcoming market and one that is particularly primeval.242 As China continues to establish a dominant position
along the eastern coastline of the continent through aid and investment,
235. See U.S. Engagement, supra note 13.
236. See Douglas Dunbar & Julia Martı́nez Vivancos, Report on the Review Conference
of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Kampala, Uganda, May 31– June
11, 2010, AM. NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORG. COAL. FOR THE INT’L CRIM. CT., June 25, 2010, at
8.
237. The United States at the Review Conference of the Rome Statute pledged to support capacity building as well as facilitate domestic prosecutions. See Review Conference of the Rome Statute, supra note 201, at 18.
238. Id. at 2– 4.
239. Id. at 3.
240. Id. at 2.
241. WHITE HOUSE, NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 228.
242. Id. at 4.
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the United States needs a valuable economic counterweight to retain its
viable role there.243 The infiltration of the United States in the developing
markets carries an invaluable benefit to the United States both in facilitating the development of free-markets and in establishing a vital trade position in the continent. The establishment of democratic governance
coupled with alliance strengthening is critical for the furtherance of the
United States’ economic interests in the region. For instance, a reinforcement of the U.S. alliance with Uganda could make use of Uganda’s growing
economy in order to increase trade within the East African Community
(“EAC”). Exporting primarily through ports in Mombasa and Dar es
Salaam, the EAC still has problems accessing the markets of its interior
members.244
The newly discovered oil reserves around the Great Lakes in Central
Africa also fall within the primary interests of the United States.245 Not
only does the United States obtain 20% of its imported oil from Africa but
it is also in its interests to maintain and expand U.S. access to African
energy.246 Uganda’s Lake Albert could open up new trade corridors and
promote the creation of additional interior trade routes from the DRC and
South Sudan, through Uganda, to Kenya and northern Tanzania.247 By
facilitating a policy of accountability and democratization in Africa
through empowering the role of the ICC in this endeavor, the United States
may also galvanize its economic and geopolitical interests in the area.
Through such an integrated international security and economic policy,
the United States may increase its influence with the African states, reassert its role as the global leader in issues of international concern, cultivate
new alliances or stabilize old ones, and finally assert its economic interests
in the continent.
III. The Role of Civil Society
Liberal theories in international relations are the primary field of a
multi-causal explanation for the behavior of states.248 They understand
states as larger institutions that are made up from the aggregate of preferences of the non-state actors within them.249 These non-state actors in
243. Id. at 24.
244. U.S. Strategic Interests in Uganda, STRATFOR (Mar. 8, 2012), https://www.stratfor
.com/analysis/us-strategic-interests-uganda.
245. Id.
246. David H. Shinn, Former U.S. Ambassador to Burk. Faso and Eth., Africa,
Remarks at the George Washington University China Policy Program and China Institute
of International Studies Fifth Symposium: U.S.-China Relations in a Global Context
(June 1, 2011), davidshinn.blogspot.com/2011/06/us-africa-relations-and-cooperation
.html.
247. U.S. Strategic Interests in Uganda, supra note 244.
248. Stephen D. Krasner, Global Communications and National Power: Life on the
Pareto Frontier, 43 WORLD POLITICS 336, 337– 42 (1991) (discussing the importance of
considering factors beyond market failure for regime analysis).
249. Andrew Moravcsik, Liberal Theories of International Law, in INTERDISCIPLINARY
PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART
83, 84 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds., 2013).
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turn, shape state interests based on the level of their organization, weight
in society, and political influence.250 Anne-Marie Slaughter views states as
“configurations of individual and group interests, who then project those
interests into the international system through a particular kind of government.”251 Realism, by attempting to explain the outcomes of strategic
interaction and bargaining, does not focus on how these coordination
games come into being.252 Liberal theories manage to get a different view
of the substantive content of international interactions.253 Under this liberal lens, we can assess compliance by focusing on the influence civil society may have on the situation states and third states, as well as the
influence of transnational networks in realizing the goal of compliance
with ICC arrest and surrender requests.
A.

Civil Society & Situation States

Civil Society within situation states has the ability to directly apply
pressure on their government to execute arrest warrants, or even apply
pressure to hinder arrests. In 2003 the former Liberian President Charles
Taylor, against whom the SCSL issued an open arrest warrant, fled to Nigeria where President Obasanjo granted him asylum.254 Two Nigerian businessmen who alleged offences against them by Taylor’s forces in Liberia
challenged in Nigerian Courts the legality of his asylum and requested his
extradition to SCSL.255 At first the Nigerian judiciary took no action and
delayed the case.256 After the substantial support the claimants received
from local and transnational NGOs providing them with resources to pursue the claim and mounting a massive public campaign within and beyond
Nigeria, however, the case was finally heard by a court.257 Of course, the
case of Charles Taylor was already on the agenda of the international community as it formed part of the SCSL docket.258 Nonetheless, the combined efforts of domestic protest coupled with national and transnational
NGOs not only kept the issue on the agenda but also contributed to its
resolution.259 In the face of domestic and international pressure, senior
Nigerian politicians who had kept silent before voiced their support for the
specific legal case as well as the general movement towards Taylor’s arrest
and extradition.260
After nearly three years the combined effort of states and civil society
250. Id. at 84– 85.
251. Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Relations, Principal Theories, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 4 (Max Planck ed., 2011).
252. Krasner, supra note 248.
253. Moravcsik, supra note 249, at 87.
254. Gill Wigglesworth, The End of Impunity? Lessons from Sierra Leone, 84 INT’L AFF.
809, 815– 17 (2008).
255. See id. at 809.
256. See id. at 809, 815– 17.
257. OPEN SOCIETY JUST. INITIATIVE, ANNUAL REPORT 2007: CIVIL SOCIETY PRESSURE: ENDING CHARLES TAYLOR’S ASYLUM (2007).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
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led to the flight and subsequent arrest of Charles Taylor.261 This case illustrates the potential of domestic civil society actors to influence their own
governments but also the power of domestic and transnational advocacy
networks to influence states. On the other hand, in the situation of the
former Yugoslavia, civil society was heavily opposed to ICTY cooperation
and the arrest and extradition of their “hometown heroes.”262 The media
also played a big role in this context. Serbian media was run, in large part,
by the same people who during the war engaged in hate speech and incitement against Bosniaks and Croats.263 Most mass media reports after the
establishment of the ICTY tended to victimize the Serb population and
question the legality and legitimacy of the ICTY.264 Accordingly, the pressure from the civil society was rarely on the government to arrest ICTY
indictees but instead developed an atmosphere of denunciation of the
ICTY and legitimation of the alleged perpetrators.265 This social environment in the former Yugoslavia may well have been a factor in the bad initial
arrest record of the court.
B.

Civil Society & Third States

Domestic actors have also influenced the decision of third states to
take action against a state that does not comply with ICC’s arrest warrants.
In the case of the arrest warrant against Al-Bashir, proponents of the Court
often argue that ideally, the arrest warrant ought to hinder him from effectively engaging in international politics, undermining his credibility and
ultimately leading to his arrest and regime change.266 The cooperation of
third states is thus required in order to hinder his free traveling by making
him a pariah as a crucial part of OTP’s long-term strategy for the execution
of the arrest warrant.267 For this purpose, civil society has played an
important part in both Kenya and the CAR demanding that Al-Bashir not
be welcomed.268 Civil society in both these ICC member states protested
and pressured the governments, which led to cancellations of the expected
visits, imposing a de facto travel ban.269 In Serbia, the United States
applied pressure on Belgrade to arrest those indicted by the ICTY including
261. Amnesty International and Patricia M. Wald see civil society as causal factor for
Taylor’s arrest. Dicker sees the combined pressure of third States as a significant factor.
See Wald, supra note 120, at 246; Civil Society Efforts to Bring Charles Taylor to Justice,
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Apr. 23, 2012, 3:55 PM), http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/04/
23/civil-society-efforts-bring-charles-taylor-justice; Dicker, supra note 164.
262. A poll in Serbia showed that only 15% of the population supported cooperation
with the ICTY. See Wald, supra note 120, at 246.
263. Nenad Golèevski et al., Facing the Past: Media Framing of War Crimes in PostConflict Serbia, 6 MEDIA, WAR & CONFLICT 118, 129 (2013).
264. Id. at 119, 126, 127, 129.
265. Id.
266. Gosnell, supra note 78, at 845.
267. Id.
268. Stella Ndirangu, Kenyan Civil Society Calls on UNSC to Refuse ICC Investigation
Deferral, 42 MONITOR 6, 7 (2011), http://connection.ebscohost.com/c/articles/655283
41/kenyan-civil-society-calls-unsc-refuse-icc-investigation-deferral.
269. Id.
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the former head of state Slobodan Milos̆eviæ.270 In this case also, civil
society and NGOs played a substantial role in shaping U.S. policy, which
ultimately turned out critical for the arrest and surrender of those
indicted.271 Finally, an example of how civil society and NGOs in particular can influence governments to take action is the campaign of the NGO
Invisible Children.272 Despite the controversial character of the content
and accuracy of the campaign,273 Invisible Children produced the YouTube
video “Kony 2012” that was received by an extremely large audience within
and outside of the United States. The U.S. government explicitly took into
account this campaign that significantly helped improve the general awareness surrounding Joseph Kony’s arrest,274 and identified the ICC as a legitimate and responsible institution for Kony’s potential arrest and trial.
C.

Transnational Networks

Often, the lines between local, foreign, and transnational NGOs are
not clearly drawn. Specialized transnational NGOs such as Human Rights
Watch and Amnesty International along with their local offices have been
heavily involved in situations where international crimes are alleged to
have been committed.275 Transnational networks are the subject of much
attention in the liberalist as well as constructivist scholarship. These
approaches view transnational networks either as a result of the interconnectedness of various networks of governmental officials, states, and nonstate actors including their role in shaping state action,276 or as transnational advocacy groups with an effect on the emergence of international
norms.277 Thus, the formation of transnational networks in order to pursue a common agenda and influence the preferences of states can be of
particular importance to the ICC arrest and surrender pursuit.278 Perhaps
the most well-known example of such a transnational network’s success is
the advocacy for and eventual adoption of the Ottawa Convention against
Antipersonnel Mines.279 Unsatisfied with states’ slow and stale effort to
address a weapon that was responsible for a myriad of indiscriminate civil270. Tracey Gurd, Arresting the “Big Fish”: Lessons on State Cooperation for the International Criminal Court, in THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 27, 28– 29
(Nick Donovan ed., 2009).
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Ryan Hal Budish, Click to Change: Optimism Despite Online Activism’s Unmet
Expectations, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 745, 755– 57 (2012).
274. ARIEFF ET AL., supra note 176, at 2 n.8.
275. See Gurd, supra note 270.
276. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (Princeton Univ. Press
2004).
277. See, e.g., MARGARET E. KECK & KATHRYN SIKKINK, ACTIVISTS BEYOND BORDERS:
ADVOCACY NETWORKS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 1– 2 (Cornell Univ. Press 1998); SIDNEY
TARROW, THE NEW TRANSNATIONAL ACTIVISM 20 (Jack A. Goldstone et al. eds., Cambridge
Univ. Press 2005); M. Finnemore & K. Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 887, 887 (1998).
278. TARROW, supra note 277, at 161– 79.
279. Richard Price, Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets
Landmines, 52 INT’L ORG. 613, 613 (1998).
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ian deaths in more than a dozen countries, humanitarian and public health
NGOs decided to form a coalition to reach a comprehensive agreement
against its deployment and use.280 This coalition was backed by efforts of
IOs such as the ICRC and the UN as well as a core number of states interested in the prohibition of anti-personnel landmines such as Canada, Norway, and France. These states provided the coalition with resources and
enhanced its perceived legitimacy.281 After an initial slow progress, the
coalition expanded to NGOs, IOs, and states globally leading to the adoption of the Ottawa treaty in 1998 and further advocacy and endorsement of
the rule as customary international law by states.282
The success of the Landmine Convention has been attributed to different actors; some view it as a result of the transnational NGO movement,283
others of the determined efforts by the core states,284 and others as a result
of IOs determination.285 Perhaps a more comprehensive approach is to
understand the success of the coalition as a combination of all these factors.286 This suggests that transnational networks are particularly effective
when comprised of different actors such as states, NGOs, and IOs, and
have a narrow focal point like the prohibition of landmines.287 Even
though the landmines campaign advocated for the adoption and diffusion
of a new norm instead of demanding compliance with an existing one, it
illustrates the ways in which concerted action among different actors may
influence state behavior. For our purposes the case of Charles Taylor
comes again as an example. After it was clear that Taylor was granted political Asylum in Nigeria, a network was formed to bring about enforcement
of an international norm manifested in the ICC arrest warrant.288 More
specifically, over 360 NGOs from 17 African states and transnational
NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International formed
the coalition “Campaign Against Impunity,” which intensively lobbied for
Taylor’s arrest within and outside Nigeria.289 An inter-state network comprised of the United States, United Kingdom, and Liberia supported this
network.290 The UN and SCSL were also inevitably involved in the coordination of these efforts as part of the greater network of states and NGOs
280. Id.
281. See generally Robert J. Lawson et al., The Ottawa Process and the International
Movement to Ban Landmines, in TO WALK WITHOUT FEAR: THE GLOBAL MOVEMENT TO BAN
LANDMINES 160 (M.A. Cameron et al. eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1998).
282. Id.; TARROW, supra note 277, at 174; see also APLC State Parties and Signatories,
UNITED NATIONS, https://www.un.org/disarmament/geneva/aplc/states-parties-and-signatories/ (last visited Nov. 7, 2016).
283. Price, supra note 279.
284. See generally V. Warmington & C. Tuttle, The Canadian Campaign, in TO WALK
WITHOUT FEAR: THE GLOBAL MOVEMENT TO BAN LANDMINES, supra note 281, at 48.
285. See generally S. Maslen, The Role of the International Red Cross, in TO WALK WITHOUT FEAR: THE GLOBAL MOVEMENT TO BAN LANDMINES, supra note 281, at 80.
286. TARROW, supra note 277, at 174.
287. Id. at 175.
288. J. BECKER, CAMPAIGNING FOR JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY IN PRACTICE
116– 17 (Stanford Univ. Press 2013).
289. Id.; see also OPEN SOCIETY JUST. INITIATIVE, supra note 257.
290. Dicker, supra note 164.
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that finally facilitated the arrest of Charles Taylor.291
D.

Civil Society at the Bargaining Table

As the role of civil society towards the enforcement of arrest warrants
starts to become more understood, the OTP should begin to implement its
potential in order to increase the rates for execution of arrest warrants. A
first way the OTP may employ is to engage the civil society in the bargaining game. When the OTP bargains with states regarding the execution of
arrest warrants, it should simultaneously address the civil society, engage
in outreach activities, and capitalize on the existing network of NGOs that
support the Court.
When unpacking the development of state interests, liberal institutionalism gives significant weight to the role of non-state actors.292 Putnam has
long coined the expression of the “two level game” that states must engage
in on the international and the domestic planes simultaneously regarding
issues of international law and international relations.293 Nye and Keohane have expanded on their model of complex interdependence that
focuses on the interrelation of domestic actors and state interest.294 The
central point that both these theories address is that decision makers acting on behalf of a state are concerned with both domestic and international pressure.295 They have to satisfy the demands of their domestic
constituency and at the same time bargain on the international level with
other states and IOs that equally express certain positions and seek to
influence the outcome of negotiations.296 This is something often forgotten on the negotiation table and the OTP ought to take it into account.
The concurrence of states to comply or attempt to induce compliance
of situation states with ICC arrest warrants may well depend on the preferences or demands of domestic actors. In this type of bargaining scenario,
the involvement of local or transnational NGOs could serve as an instrument of pressure. Local NGOs may reflect the domestic environment and
transnational NGOs may create awareness and support within the international civil society. The OTP had already begun to grasp the significance of
civil society’s involvement in its 2009– 2012 Prosecutorial Strategy where it
provided that “the Office of the Prosecutor’s interaction with local and
international NGOs is relevant at all stages of its activities including development of policies/practices, prevention, promotion of domestic legislation and proceedings, preliminary examination, investigation, prosecution,
cooperation, maximizing the impact of its work[,] and its understanding by
291. BECKER, supra note 288.
292. See generally ROBERT O. KEOHANE & JOSEPH S. NYE, POWER AND INTERDEPENDENCE:
WORLD POLITICS IN TRANSITION (1977).
293. Robert D. Putnam, Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two Level Games,
42 INT’L ORG. 427, 427 (1988).
294. KEOHANE & NYE, supra note 292, at 725.
295. Putnam, supra note 293, at 431.
296. Id.

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-3\CIN301.txt

2016

Mind the Gap

unknown

Seq: 41

13-APR-17

15:42

561

victims and affected communities.”297 Although the OTP has not quite yet
considered actively involving civil society in the bargaining stage— the bargaining it already engages with is rather elementary anyway— civil society
may prove a driving force for success when addressing states with regard to
arrest facilitating measures involving the domestic civil societies.
In order to win over domestic civil society within situation states, outreach is also important. The OTP is already engaged in various outreach
activities and NGOs can play an important role in closing the gap of how
far the OTP can reach due to financial or societal constraints.298 NGOs
have played a significant role in the establishment of the ICC and now
engage with it through supporting and scrutinizing it.299 They also act as
an extension of the Court regarding its communication to the public, narration and justification of its acts, and provision of information to the
Court itself.300 More than 2,500 organizations have come together to form
the NGO “Coalition for the International Criminal Court” (“CICC”) in
order to create a coordinated umbrella for their shared objectives.301 Its
members include large transnational NGOs such as Amnesty International
and Human Rights Watch as well as small and local NGOs.302 Such a
network carries an advantage that the ICC does not. The CICC has the
ability to communicate with the representatives of a vast number of NGOs
while coordinating its work directly with CICC representatives.303 There
are very few other IOs that maintain a symbiotic relationship with NGOs
as much as the ICC does. In this respect the ICC has a unique opportunity
and capabilities at hand.
In order to make full use of the NGOs, the OTP ought to work in close
cooperation with both NGOs and transnational networks to coordinate
efforts with them in realizing arrests. At this point, the OTP holds biannual round table meetings with civil society representatives organized by
the CICC “in order to exchange information and try to harmonize strategies in all those areas.”304 It also engages with relevant non-state actors
including NGOs on a daily basis through the JCCD.305 These could be
expanded and become more nuanced and targeted as the JCCD becomes a
full-fledged diplomatic arm. This way the JCCD would be able to more
effectively coordinate strategic, political, and diplomatic action particularly
regarding the enforcement of arrest warrants. The danger of neglecting
outreach and its importance is clearer in its negative context. A vivid
297. OTP, ICC, PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY 2009– 12, at 15 (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www
.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/66A8DCDC-3650-4514-AA62-D229D1128F65/281506/OTPProsecutorialStrategy20092013.pdf [hereinafter OTP PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY].
298. See SCHIFF, supra note 88, at 151– 54.
299. Coalition of the International Criminal Court Fact Sheet, COALITION FOR INT’L CRIM.
CT., http://www.iccnow.org/documents/Coalition_Factsheet.pdf (last visited Nov. 7,
2016).
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. See SCHIFF, supra note 88, at 147.
304. OTP PROSECUTORIAL STRATEGY, supra note 297, at 15– 16.
305. Id. at 11.
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example is that of the negative perception the Croatian and Serbian civil
societies have had towards the ICTY.306 The Tribunal failed to establish
any outreach offices at all prior to 2000 and it was not until that same year
that it began to translate its press releases into Serbo-Croatian.307 Additionally, the ICTY didn’t have any explicit relationship with the existing or
new NGOs that were rapidly beginning to form in order to address the
post-conflict situation in former Yugoslavia.308 Although the OTP has
been so far fairly successful in its outreach, it needs to expand its outreach
engagement to activities that begin from the moment an arrest warrant is
issued or perhaps even before it is issued. This will in turn facilitate
domestic pressure on the government to comply, or at least prevent or mitigate some negative perceptions of the Court and its work.
Conclusion: A Coordination of Campaigns
This Article has sought to identify a trajectory towards increasing the
enforcement and success rates of ICC arrest and surrender requests. In
order to put all the pieces of the puzzle together, I have argued that the OTP
needs to map out a comprehensive strategy to facilitate and manage campaigns that make use of all the means available at its disposal. This will
include using the pressure and help coming from all possible actors and
sources including states, civil society, and the Court itself.309 The most
crucial precondition for launching campaigns designed to lead to the arrest
of perpetrators is the OTP’s willingness to do so. As set out in this Article,
at the moment the OTP has been hesitant lest it is perceived as a political
actor, and rather orients itself on the extreme end of the domestic judiciary
model. Taking a proactive stance, recognizing the integral part of political
realities, and bargaining are all necessary components in order to make full
use of the OTP’s assets at hand.
The “assets” the OTP has at its disposal to realize the execution of
arrest warrants are third states with overlapping interests including member and non-member states, activist states, and a large network of local and
transnational NGOs. I have argued that, at the moment, their capabilities
often remain unused due to lack of effective coordination that specifically
targets recalcitrant states. The OTP, supported by a new diplomatic arm,
should adopt a new comprehensive strategy that capitalizes on these actors
in order to arrest indictees. I have also argued that transnational campaigns are most successful when joined by multiple actors working on different levels towards the goal of arrest warrant enforcement. Focal points
need to be established that are narrowly defined to concentrate action and
unify the movement under one banner. Such focal points could be the
arrest of indictees in one particular situation state or even the arrest of
specific indictees through narrowly defined sub-points— for instance, the
306.
307.
308.
309.

See LAMONT, supra note 122.
Id.
Id.
See Gurd, supra note 270, at 31.
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diplomatic and political isolation of a state, a boycott of contact with
indictees who are senior politicians, asset freezes, and travel bans.
When planning the strategy of the campaign, the first step is to use the
JCCD to thoroughly assess the situation at hand. The OTP will then identify leverage points to help or pressure the non-compliant state. This will
lead to an assessment of what kind of strategy or combination of strategies
is required to better approach the situation. Sometimes certain kinds of
inducements could prove successful, other times reputational sanctions
such as naming and shaming are important, and other times technical and
intelligence assistance are needed. A combination of different measures
applied from multiple sources is an element currently missing and is what
could improve the OTP’s fairly poor arrest and surrender rates. The next
step is to consider which states, IOs, or regional organizations could best
realize the measures needed. The OTP should first approach those actors
with overlapping interests in the arrest, or general activism when it comes
to enforcement aspects of international justice, and lobby for these measures. While doing so, the OTP should engage with civil society in order to
increase the incentives of third states to achieve these measures. At the
same time, the OTP should spearhead successful outreach activities within
the situation state, in coordination with the local civil society, in order to
prevent a negative perception of the Court and positively engage the local
civil society to apply pressure on their government.
The adventures of the ad hoc Tribunals offer insight on issues of state
compliance that transcend the sterile judicial environment and involve the
morbid realpolitik. I have argued that the singular nature of the ICC
empowered by its potential political dynamic may be incorporated into a
model which integrates the judicial mandate with political cognizance.
Under this model, the OTP bears significant leverage in productively utilizing the Court’s bargaining with situation states as well as towards the international actors that have the ability to affect the success of arrest warrant
enforcement. The OTP has the ability to become a significant international
player that, backed by an alliance of states and non-state actors, could coordinate efforts in order to bring to justice the perpetrators of the most egregious international crimes. This indeed requires a difficult balance, which
often rushes opinion to a blanket contestation against any involvement of
the Court with political realities. However, and despite current skepticism,
it is important to identify what is becoming all the more so apparent: the
interests of international criminal justice and political strategy are heavily
intertwined in a world where human rights and international criminal justice are not a universally shared ideal.
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